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Abstract
This Comment examines the extent to which the Intellectual Property and International Trade
Court (IPIT) satisfies the intellectual property enforcement provisions of Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). Part I presents the legal environment of
intellectual property in Thailand before TRIPs, the background of TRIPs, and the enforcement
requirements of TRIPs. Part II discusses the legislation creating the IPIT Court, and assesses
the enforcement procedures as prescribed by the legislation that created the IPIT Court and as
employed by the IPIT Court. Part III argues that the IPIT Court is a positive development because
it reduces conflict between Western ideas of intellectual property protection and Thai standards of
protection, and because it promotes Thai compliance with TRIPs. This Comment concludes that
the establishment of a separate court with exclusive jurisdiction and unique procedures follows
historical and cultural traditions in Thailand, even though the IPIT Court was created at the behest
of the United States and the European Union.
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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property rights,1 without enforcement, are
worthless according to experts and scholars. 2 The intangible na-
ture of intellectual property, which allows it to flow relatively
freely across borders, presents a need for international enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights.3 There is, however, no in-
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1. See PAUL MARETr, MARETr: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 1 (1996) (defining in-
tellectual property as intangible products or creations of human intellect). According
to Paul Marett, intellectual property is intangible property, and is similar to shares in a
company, which may be transferred. Id. The three dominant forms of intellectual
property are copyright, patents, and trademarks. Id. at 2.
2. See Renato Ruggiero, Message from the Director-General of the World Trade Organiza-
tion, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw FORUM: SPECIAL
ISSUE 1998 XV (1998) ("Laws for the protection of intellectual property rights are of no
account if intellectual property rights cannot be effectively enforced."); Michael L. Do-
ane, TRIPs and International Intellectual Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technol-
ogy, 9 Am. UJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465, 482 (1994) (stating that "[i]ntellectual property
rights are useless without adequate enforcement provisions."); Arthur Wineburg, Juris-
prudence in Asia: Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 5 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 25, 27
(1997) (stating that enforcement of intellectual property laws is intractable problem);
Arthur Wineburg & Edmund H. Mantell, Managing Intellectual Property-An International
Capital Asset, 99 CoM. L.J. 366, 368 (1994) ("The value of intellectual property depends
upon the extent of one's rights to it are recognized and enforceable.").
3. See MARETr, supra note 1, at 18 (claiming that because intellectual property can
rarely be confined within national borders, right-holders may need to invoke laws of
another country, where counterfeiting takes place, to protect his or her intellectual
property); Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-
MORAL, LEGAL, & INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 19 (Adam D. Moore ed. 1997) (asserting
that intellectual objects are non-exclusive and thus can be at many places at once and
are not consumed by use).
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ternational intellectual property law per se;4 instead intellectual
property rights are subject to the principle of territoriality. 5
These rights vary according to what each state recognizes and
enforces.6 Corresponding to the growth of trade and improve-
ments in technology, there have been many important interna-
tional efforts at harmonizing intellectual property rights protec-
tion that are based on the principles of national treatment 7 and
minimum rights.8 According to scholars, the most significant ef-
fort to date is Annex IC of the World Trade Organization
("WTO") Agreement9 that establishes universal minimum stan-
4. See CRAIGJOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAw 29 (Mathew Bender & Co. 4th ed. 1998)
(stating that author who wishes to protect his work abroad must look to pertinent na-
tional laws of the countries where protection is sought, because there is no universal
copyright system).
5. See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37
VA. J. INT'L L. 505 (1997) (commenting on territorial reach of intellectual property law
and presumption against extraterritoriality);Joanna Schmidt-Szalewski, The International
Protection of Trademarks After the TRIPS Agreement, 9 DUKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 189, 190
(1998) (stating that principle of territoriality governs intellectual property rights); Jef-
freyJ. Blatt & Phillip H. Miller, Preparing for the Pacific Century: Fostering Technology Trans-
fer in Southeast Asia, 3 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 235, 241 (1996) (stating that intellec-
tual property protection is territorial in nature). Jeffrey Blatt and Phillip Miller note
that the specific intellectual property laws of each jurisdiction are unique and reflect
the local culture and concerns due to the territorial limits of laws. Id.
6. See Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 5, at 190 (stating that rights are effective only
in country that creates such rights); Bradley, supra note 5, at 548 (noting that nation
where conduct in question occurred determines applicable law).
7. See Bradley, supra note 5, at 547-48 (defining national treatment principle as
requiring foreign nationals receive same intellectual property protection as afforded to
each signatory country's citizens); JOYCE, supra note 4, at 28-29 (noting that in 1827,
various German states initiated formal reciprocity of protection that continues as na-
tional treatment).
8. See ANTHONY D'AMATO & DORIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAw 8 (Kluwer Law International 1997) (remarking that development of in-
ternational standards reflects history of growth of trade and development of technology
and global marketplace); Bradley, supra note 5, at 548 (defining minimum rights as
necessary because nondiscrimination alone does not guarantee adequate protection of
foreign intellectual property interests); JOYCE, supra note 4, at 28-29 (noting that in
1886, Berne Convention introduced minima to supplement national treatment).
9. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Ne-
gotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. See About the WTO (vis-
ited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.wto.org> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) (remarking that establishment of World Trade Organization ("WTO") on Jan.
1, 1995 marked largest reform of international trade since World War II). The WTO is
an international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations as embod-
ied in the WTO Agreement. Id. The WTO Agreement is a contract that binds its mem-
ber nations to keep their trade policies within agreed limits. Id.
2000] TRIPS TO THAILAND
dards for intellectual property protection in the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights' °("TRIPs") .11
Attitudes toward intellectual property tend to differ greatly
between those countries that import intellectual property and
those that export it.12 Southeast Asia is a net consumer and im-
porter of intellectual property and the focus of much attention
from the nations that are net producers and exporters, such as
the United States and the European Union.'" As one of the larg-
est economies in the Association of South-East Asian Nations
14
("ASEAN"), new developments in Thailand affect the entire re-
gion."3 According to the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, despite Thai-
10. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Mar-
rakesh, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion; Annex III, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs].
11. See Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker, Preface to FROM GATT TO
TRIPs-THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATED AsPECrS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
v (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, 1996) (stating that Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs") is "the most impor-
tant event in the history of the protection of intellectual property since the creation of
the major international conventions more than 100 years ago."). Friedrich-Karl Beier
and Gerhard Schricker further state that TRIPs is "an integral element of the new world
order." Id.
12. See MAaTrr, supra note 1, at 215 (stating that different nations' perceptions of
intellectual property enforcement depend on whether they import and consume it or
export and produce it).
13. Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, O.J. C 340/2 (1997),
37 I.L.M. 67 [hereinafter Consolidated TEU], incorporating changes made by Treaty of
Amsterdam amending Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the Euro-
pean Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [herein-
after Treaty of Amsterdam] (amending Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty
establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and
EC Treaty). See John J.P. Howley & Antonio B. Roman, Assessing Enforcement Status of
Intellectual Property Rights in Asia, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 26, 1999 (commenting that, for many
years, United States has had serious problem with enforcement of intellectual property
tights in Asia).
14. The Association of South-East Asian Nations ("ASEAN") was established on Au-
gust 8,1967 in Bangkok, Thailand by five original member nations of Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. ASEAN Secretariat (visited Jan. 3, 2000)
<http://www.aseansec.org> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). Later,
Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam also joined ASEAN. Id. According to
ASEAN public statements, its fundamental goal is cooperative peace and shared pros-
perity. Id.
15. See ASEAN Overview Statistics (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://www.us-asean.org/
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land's improvements in its intellectual property legal system, en-
forcement remains a problem.' 6 The single most important de-
velopment in Thailand to combat this problem is the
establishment of the Intellectual Property and International
Trade Court17 ("IPIT Court" or "Court").' 8
This Comment examines the extent to which the IPIT
Court satisfies the intellectual property enforcement provisions
of TRIPs. Part I presents the legal environment of intellectual
property in Thailand before TRIPs, the background of TRIPs,
and the enforcement requirements of TRIPs. Part II discusses
the legislation creating the IPIT Court, and assesses the enforce-
ment procedures as prescribed by the legislation that created the
IPIT Court and as employed by the IPIT Court. Part III argues
that the IPIT Court is a positive development because it reduces
conflict between Western ideas of intellectual property protec-
tion and Thai standards of protection, and because it promotes
Thai compliance with TRIPs. This Comment concludes that the
establishment of a separate court with exclusive jurisdiction and
unique procedures follows historical and cultural traditions in
aseanoverview/statistics.htn> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (re-
porting that ASEAN is third largest overseas trading partner for United States).
Although its rate of growth is behind that for exports to China, in dollar terms, U.S.
exports to ASEAN are nearly four times those of China. Id. The 1997 nominal gross
domestic product ("GDP") of ASEAN was approximately US$675 billion. Id. Of this
amount, Thailand was responsible for a 1997 nominal GDP of US$188.9 billion. See
Department of State Report Submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
and on Finance and to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and on Ways and
Means, Thailand: Economic Policy and Trade Practices Report (1997) (visited Jan. 3, 2000)
<http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/tradereports/eastasia97/thai-
land97.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (reporting trade statis-
tics for Thailand).
16. See U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service & U.S. Department of State, American
Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, Thailand: Investment Climate Statement for 1997 (1/2),
INT'L MKT. INSIGHT REP., June 13, 1997 [hereinafter Investment Climate 1997] ("While
Thailand's legal structure for the protection of property rights is reaching world-class
standards, enforcement continues to be a problem.").
17. THE AcT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AND PROCEDURE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE COURT, B.E. 2539 (1996) (Thail.) [hereinafter AcT].
18. See Interview with Akarawit Sumawong, ChiefJustice, Intellectual Property and
International Trade Court, in Bangkok, Thail. (June 15, 1999) (calling Intellectual
Property and International Trade Court ("IPIT Court") most important recent develop-
ment in intellectual property protection in Thailand); see also Christian H. Nguyen,
Comment, A Unitary ASEAN Patent Law in the Aftermath of TRIPs, 8 PAC. RiM L. & POL'YJ.
453, 479 (1999) (noting that other nations with specialized intellectual property courts
are China, Germany, United Kingdom, and United States). Currently, Thailand is the
only ASEAN nation with a specialized intellectual property court. Nguyen, supra.
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Thailand, even though the IPIT Court was created at the behest
of the United States and the European Union.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THAILAND AD
COMPLIANCE WITH TRIPS
While Thai law embraced the concept of intellectual prop-
erty rights over a hundred years ago,19 Thailand has developed
its intellectual property rights laws only in response to interna-
tional pressure. 20 Unlike other Asian nations that exhibited xen-
ophobia towards the West, Thailand has long recognized the im-
portance and benefits of maintaining international relations.2
Thailand has sought to benefit from its relations with Western
nations by encouraging foreign investment, trade, and technol-
ogy transfers.22 To advance this goal, Thailand became a mem-
ber country of the WTO, promised to comply with TRIPs, and
adopted laws to protect intellectual property rights.23
A. Intellectual Property in Thailand
Scholars note that Thailand's negotiations with its trading
partners have influenced the substance of rights Thailand has
granted in its intellectual property acts.24 Enforcement of those
19. ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF VACHIRAYAN LIBRARY FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY
WoRR, R.S. 111 (1892) (Thail.). See Weerawit Weeraworawit, Copyright in Thailand, in
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW FORUM: SPECIAL ISSUE
1998 47 (1998) (alleging that copyright is not new result of Thailand's rapid moderni-
zation).
20. See, e.g., Sakda Thanitcul, Vagueness and Enforceability: Potential Problems of the
1991 Thai Trademark Act, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL'YJ. 31, 33 (1994) (asserting that Thailand
modeled its first trademark act on British Trademark Act of 1905).
21. See THAILAND 152 (DK Publishing, Inc. 1997) (reporting that Thailand estab-
lished diplomatic and trade contacts with Dutch, English, French, and Portuguese dur-
ing 16th and 17th centuries and sent envoys to court of Louis XIV).
22. See TILLEKE & GIBBINS, THAILAND BUSINESS PRACTICES 10, 11 (1993) (explaining
that Thailand has maintained friendly relations with major powers and may benefit by
attracting investment, trade, and technology).
23. See Piyawat Kayasit, Thailand: New IP Enforcement Mechanisms Developing, IP ASIA,
Oct. 1998, at 15 (revealing that Thailand realizes level of intellectual property rights
protection must be raised to attract foreign investors and to comply with TRIPs); Wuti-
pong Vechayanon, Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement and the Role of Intellectual Property
Court in Thailand, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw Fo-
RUM: SPECIAL ISSUE 1998 33 (1998) (stating that Thailand recognizes that honoring its
WTO obligations is crucial to Thailand's economic development and prosperity).
24. See Thanitcul, supra note 20, at 32 (commenting that amendments to trade-
mark legislation resulted from negotiations with United States); see also Stefan Kirchan-
ski, Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing Countries: U.S. Efforts To Enforce Pharma-
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rights, however, was problematic. 25 Before the IPIT Court, per-
sons claiming infringement of their intellectual property rights
employed a system that lacked the specialization necessary to
handle intellectual property matters.
26
1. Sources of Intellectual Property Rights in Thailand
Thailand is a civil law country with a legal history stretching
back at least as far as the thirteenth century.2 7 As seen in Thai
historical legal codes, Thailand is able to accommodate external
influences by co-existing with those influences. 28 Modern intel-
lectual property law in Thailand finds its sources in legislative
codes and international intellectual property treaties. 29
a. Historical Influences on Thai Legal System
Traditional Thai law has been traced to three sources: Chi-
nese Maritime law,3 ° customary Thai law,"' and Buddhist law.
3 2
ceutical Patents in Thailand, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 67 (Anthony
D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds., Kluwer Law International, 1997) (noting that Thai
negotiations with United States prompted revisions to patent legislation).
25. See Yvonne Chua, Global Developments in Protecting Against Counterfeiting and In-
fringement of Trademarks and Copyrights, 455 PRAc. L. INST.: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADE-
MARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 195, 227 (1996) (asserting
that main obstacle to enforcement was lack of administrative and judicial infrastruc-
ture); U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service & U.S. Department of State, American Em-
bassy in Bangkok, Thailand, Thailand: Investment Climate Statement for 1998 (1/2), INT'L
MKT. INSIGHT REP., June 18, 1998 [hereinafter Investment Climate 1998] (declaring that,
although Thai intellectual property is approaching world class standards, enforcement
remains problematic).
26. See Interview with Sae Sujintaya, Attorney, Director, Intellectual Property Oper-
ations, Tilleke & Gibbins, R.O.P., in Bangkok, Thail. (June 30, 1999) [hereinafter
Sujintaya] (setting forth that judges of courts of general jurisdiction lacked specialized
training in intellectual property law); Chua, supra note 25, at 228 (revealing instances of
Thai judges in courts of general jurisdiction misapplying intellectual property law).
27. See Sompong Sucharitkul, Thai Law and Buddhist Law, 46 Am. J. CoMP. L. 69,
76 (1998) (tracing history of Thai law back to Sukothai Stone Inscriptions, circa 1292,
which are collections of earliest Thai customs and Royal Codes); Jonathan w. Leeds,
United States International Law Enforcement Cooperation: A Case Study in Thaiand, 7J. INT'L
L. & PRAc. 1, 3 (1998) (recognizing that Buddhist law influenced secular Thai law as of
1296).
28. See THE Acr CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS (1908) (Thail.)
(establishing separate court to handle matters involving non-Thais).
29. See Thanitcul, supra note 20, at 32 (attributing parts of Trademark Act of 1991
to Model Law for Developing Countries on Marks, Trade Names, and Acts of Unfair
Competition, 1967, of United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual
Property).
30. See Sucharitkul, supra note 27, at 74 (defining Chinese maritime law as result of
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While the exact extent of the influences of Buddhist law and
Chinese maritime trade practices are undeterminable, they are
widely acknowledged as comprising a portion of traditional Thai
law.33 In 1805, King Rama I, of the present Chakri Dynasty, is-
sued the Three Seals Code, which systematically classified the ex-
isting statutes, edicts, and customs from these different
sources.
34
In 1897, King Rama V, more popularly known as King Chu-
lalongkorn, began a process of modernization and westerniza-
tion of Thailand's legal system. 5 Authorized by the Ministry of
Justice, the Law Reform Commission adopted the civil law system
for its ease of organization and simplicity of enactment. 36 The
Law Reform Commission issued a Code of Civil Procedure, a
Civil and Commercial Code, a Penal Code, and a Statute on the
Courts of Justice. 37 The Statute on the Courts of Justice estab-
lished three levels of Thai courts. As a civil law country, Thai
courts do not rely on prior decisions as precedent, but consider
maritime commercial customs practiced throughout South-east Asia by Chinese trading
partners).
31. See id. at 76 (defining customary Thai law as earliest Thai customs, before
adoption of Buddhism, as collected in Ahom Buranji legal texts). The Ahom Buranji
illustrates that earliest Thai custom "attach [ed] considerable importance to the mainte-
nance of cultural separateness . . . ." Id.
32. See id. at 69 (defining Buddhist law as religious principles, binding in Buddhist
community, based on teachings of Buddha). According to Mr. Sompong Sucharitkul,
one influence of Buddhist law upon Thai secular law is the concession that Thai law
governs "a pluralistic society wherein persons of different faiths could be subject to
different personal laws .... " Id. at 86. Buddhist law strongly influenced secular tradi-
tional Thai law, especially in the northern Thai Lanna Kingdom, which began in 1296.
See Leeds, supra note 27 (noting that Royal Decrees and judgments often compared
state law with religious texts). The Lanna kings relied on Buddhist monks to be the
official scribes documenting the royal decrees. Leeds, supra. To give their rule author-
ity and legitimacy, the Lanna kings required that Buddhist texts support the laws to be
administered. Id.
33. See Sucharitkul, supra note 27, at 74 (noting that scholars are unable to distin-
guish effect of neighboring Asian influences on traditional Thai law).
34. See id. at 75 (stating that Three Seals Code sought to eradicate conflicts be-
tween earlier texts, conform Thai law to religious texts and to organize laws into
groups).
35. See Leeds, supra note 27, at 3 (reporting that King Chulalongkorn enlisted aid
of non-Thai legal experts from Belgium, England, and Japan to assist process of refor-
mation).
36. Id.
37. Sucharitkul, supra note 27, at 75.
38. STATUTE ON THE COURTS OF JUSTICE (1897) (Thail.). See Tilleke & Gibbins,
Thailand Law Digest Reviser, MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, THAI-9 (1999) [hereinafter MARTIN-
DALE-HUBBELL] (describing Courts of First Instance, Courts of Appeal and Dika, or
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the decisions of the Thai Supreme Court as secondary author-
ity.39 The Law Reform Commission also established the first In-
ternational Court in Thailand, over which Thai and European
judges presided.4" The first International Court was a special-
ized court chartered to handle all matters that involved the citi-
zens of certain European nations.41
b. Intellectual Property Legislation in Thailand
Thai intellectual property rights stem from three domestic
legislative sources: the Trademark Act of 1991,42 the Patent Act
of 1992, 4" and the Copyright Act of 199444 as amended by the
Ministerial Regulations of 1997. 4° The Trademark Act of 1991
replaced the earlier Trademark Act of 1961,46 which did not pro-
vide a legal cause of action for the trademark holder.47 Instead,
the trademark owner relied on remedies under the civil and
criminal codes.48 The Trademark Act of 1991 protects regis-
tered marks and provides the trademark holder with criminal
remedies.49 The Thai government promulgated the Patent Act
of 1992 to remedy the specific exclusion of patent protection for
pharmaceuticals under the Patent Act of 1979." Another salient
Supreme Court). The Thai Supreme Court is unique in that it hears appeals on both
issues of law and of fact. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra.
39. See Investment Climate 1998, supra note 25, at 3 (stating that Thai courts regard
Supreme Court decisions as secondary authority).
40. THE AcT CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS (1908) (Thail.). See
Fabrice Mattei, Enforcing Copyright Law in Thailand: The New Intellectual Property Court, 75
COPYRIGHT WORLD 32 (1997) (remarking that first International Court constitutes ex-
ample of history of specialized courts in Thailand).
41. See Mattei, supra note 40 (stating that first International Court had jurisdiction
over certain non-Thai nationals in accordance with their countries' treaties with Thai-
land).
42. TRADEMARK AcT, B.E. 2534 (1991) (Thail.).
43. PATENT Acr, B.E. 2535 (1992) (Thail.).
44. COPYRIGHT AcT, B.E. 2537 (1994) (Thail.).
45. MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS, B.E. 2540 (1997) (Thail.). See MARTINDALE-HuB-
BELL supra note 38, at THAI-17, 18 (listing relevant intellectual property acts).
46. TRADEMARK Acr No. 3, B.E. 2504 (1961) (Thail.).
47. See Thanitcul, supra note 20, at 32 (explaining that U.S. Trade Representative
demanded changes to Thai trademark protection).
48. See Investment Climate 1997, supra note 16 (remarking that criminal rather than
civil law predominantly governed Thai business regulations).
49. See Chua, supra note 25, at 227 (comparing TPADEMARK ACr, B.E. 2534 (1991)
with previous Trademark Act).
50. PATENT Acr, B.E. 2535 (1992) (Thail.). See Thomas N. O'Neill III, Intellectual
Property Protection in Thailand: Asia's Young Tiger and America's "Growing" Concern, 11 U.
PA.J. INT'L Bus. L. 603, 609 (1990) (stating that Patent Act of 1979 specifically excluded
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feature of the Patent Act of 1992 is the provision for compulsory
licensing.51 Originally intended to satisfy U.S. pressure, the
copyright bill was hotly debated and even caused a government
to fall in 1988.2 Eventually passed in 1994, the Copyright Act
provides both criminal and civil liabilities.53
Other sources of intellectual property rights are the interna-
tional intellectual property treaties to which Thailand is a signa-
tory.54 These treaties and organizations require member coun-
tries to grant and recognize certain substantive intellectual prop-
erty rights and provide reciprocal treatment to citizens of other
member countries. 5 Among the intellectual property treaties
Thailand belongs to are the Berne Convention for the Protec-
tion of Literary and Artistic Works 56 ("Berne Convention"), the
World Intellectual Property Organization 57  ("WIPO"), and
TRIPs.58 As a member country of the Berne Convention since
1931, Thailand has promised to provide reciprocal copyright
food and pharmaceutical products, pharmaceutical ingredients, agricultural machin-
ery, plant or biological processes, scientific or mathematical rules and theories, and
computer programs); see also Kirchanski, supra note 24 (stating that revision to include
pharmaceutical patents was intended to satisfy U.S. objections).
51. See O'Neill, supra note 50, at 609 (reporting that Patent Act provides for com-
pulsory licenses if patent not worked in Thailand within three years and that United
States considers this provision as one shortcoming of Patent Act).
52. See id. at 606 (discussing how Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda dissolved his
cabinet after dispute over passing unpopular copyright reform legislation, for which
United States had pressed).
53. See Mattei, supra note 40 (comparing changes in Copyright Act of 1994 with
prior act).
54. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 38, at THAI-17 (listing Thailand as signa-
tory of several international intellectual property treaties).
55. See generally Frank Romano, International Conventions and Treaties, 536 PRAc. L.
INST.: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 545, 552-61 (1998) (describing main provisions of principal intellectual property
treaties and conventions).
56. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, amended Oct. 2, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
57. Constitution of the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 entered into force for the United States
on Aug. 25, 1970 [hereinafter WIPO]. See Romano, supra note 55, at 554 (discussing
WIPO history and objectives). The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")
is one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Romano, supra WIPO was
established in 1967 to administer international intellectual property treaties, promote
the protection of intellectual property and assist developing nations in creating intellec-
tual property laws. Id. WIPO has 128 members. Id.
58. See TRIPs, supra note 10, art 1(1) (requiring compliance by WTO Members
because it is annex of WTO Agreement).
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protection59 for the citizens of other Berne Convention member
countries.60 The Berne Convention and WIPO, however, lack
enforcement mechanisms and are voluntary federations that al-
low member countries to determine provisions by which they will
abide.6" One scholar has questioned their actual effectiveness as
sources of intellectual property rights.6 2
2. Intellectual Property Dispute Settlement and Enforcement
Prior to the Establishment of the IPIT Court
Prior to the establishment of the IPIT Court, parties settled
intellectual property disputes in Thailand in the courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction.6" A person claiming intellectual property right
ownership could have a cause of action under Section 420 of the
Civil and Commercial Code,6 4 which allows a civil action for
59. See Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future,
in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 258 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle
Long eds., Kluwer Law International, 1997) (defining material reciprocity as country A
granting country Bs authors same protection as country B would grant country A's
authors).
60. See Romano, supra note 55, at 621 (listing 121 States that are party to Berne
Convention); see alsoJOYCE, supra note 4, at 35 (noting that United States was last major
Western country to join Berne Convention). The United States signed on to the Berne
Convention on March 1, 1989. JOYCE, supra.
61. See Wineburg, supra note 2, at 27 (stating that it is easier for Asian countries to
adopt legislation than to reform culture to enforce these laws). According to Arthur
Wineburg, "Asian cultures share characteristics that are antagonistic to private intellec-
tual property rights." Id. The role of the family and community in Asian society affects
the Asian perspective of the process of invention and creation. Id. at 26. Traditional
Asian culture views these processes as accomplishments of the family and community to
*be shared. Id. As such, the products of these endeavors are in the public domain, and
do not warrant legal protection as personal property, which would place the individual
over society. Id. Additionally, Asian societies would consider any attempt to sequester
an advance in learning as morally wrong. Id. But see Hettinger, supra note 3, at 30
(commenting that in United States, intellectual property creators are individually
granted property rights in their works as incentive to promote progress of science and
useful arts). By contrast, Western societies consider intellectual property to be a cate-
gory of personal property. Id.; see also Adam D. Moore, Toward a Lockean Theory of
Intellectual Property, in INTELLEcrUAL PROPERTY-MORAL, LEGAL AND INTERNATIONAL DI-
LEMMAS 82 (1997) (revealing that Anglo-American systems rely on incentive justification
for granting private intellectual property rights).
62. See Monique Cordray, GA7T v. WIPO, 76J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 121,
130 (1994) (calling bilateral and multilateral agreements, prior to TRIPs, essentially
unenforceable and emphasizing that WIPO was unable to enforce intellectual property
rights granted in conventions it administered).
63. See Chua, supra note 25, at 228-29 (noting that courts handling intellectual
property disputes were not specialized).
64. CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE B.E. 2535 (1992), § 420 (Thail.). Section 420
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compensation, or Section 273-75 of the Penal Code,6 5 which pro-
vides criminal penalties for pirating.66 These statutes, combined
with the existing intellectual property codes, however, were inef-
fectual in enforcing intellectual property rights.
67
According to one expert, the general jurisdiction courts
presented obstacles to effective civil and criminal enforcement
of intellectual property rights.68 Foreign copyright, trademark,
and patent holders contended with no pre-trial discovery proce-
dures,69 burdensome technicalities, 70 and protracted proceed-
provides that "[a] person who willfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body,
health, liberty, property or any right of another person, is said to commit a wrongful act
and is bound to make compensation therefore." Id.
65. PENAL CODE, § 273-75 (Thail.). Sections 273-75 of the Penal Code read:
Section 273.- Whoever forges the registered trade-mark of the other person,
whether it be registered within or outside the Kingdom, shall be punished
with imprisonment not exceeding three years or fine not exceeding six thou-
sand baht, or both.
Section 274.- Whoever imitates the registered trade-mark of the other person,
whether it be registered within or outside the Kingdom in order to make the
public to believe that it is the registered trade-mark of such other person, shall
be punished with imprisonment not exceeding one year or fine not exceeding
two thousand baht, or both.
Section 275.- Whoever brings into the Kingdom, disposes or exposes for dispo-
sal the goods bearing the name, figure, artificial mark or any wording as pro-
vided in Section 272(1), or the goods bearing the forged or imitated trade-
mark belonging to the other person according to Section 273 or 274, shall be
liable to the same punishment as provided in such Section.
Id.
66. See TILLEKE & GIBBINS, supra note 22, at 30/2 (explaining that legal protection
of intellectual property is based on provisions of intellectual property legislation as well
as Civil and Commercial Code, Penal Code, and Consumer Protection Act).
67. See Chua, supra note 25, at 227 (stating that Thai administrative and judicial
infrastructures were not prepared to manage intellectual property matters causing ob-
stacles to effective enforcement).
68. See Wineburg, supra note 2, at 29 (noting that specific procedural differences
in Asian courts hampered efforts of Westerners to protect their intellectual property
rights).
69. See id. at 29 (claiming that most Asian countries do not allow pretrial discov-
ery); MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 38, at THAI-7 (noting that Thai courts do not
recognize interrogatories, depositions, and broad requests for document production).
70. See Alan S. Gutterman, International Intellectual Property: A Summary of Recent
Developments and Issues for the Coming Decade, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. J.
335, 382 (1992) (claiming that Thai enforcement officials placed burdensome require-
ments for documenting claims); Faye Rice, How Copycats Steal Billions: Foreign Theft of
Ideas and Innovations, from Hit Songs to Computer Software, Has Become a Huge Headache for
American Business. Wise Companies Have Learned To Fight Back., FORTUNE, Apr. 22, 1991,
at 157 (commenting that U.S. entertainment company, M.C.A., filed 14 suits between
1987 and 1990 and lost all on "outrageous technicalities" despite hiring Thailand's most
prestigious copyright attorneys).
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ings. 7' Another factor interfering with their efforts to adjudicate
their claims was a lack of expertise on the part of the judiciary.72
Should the foreign right-holder prevail, the courts granted inad-
equate awards and fines. 73 Additionally, U.S. copyright holders
found that, prior to the United States signing the Berne Conven-
tion, the indirect means they utilized to secure protection in
other nation's markets were ineffectual in Thailand.74
Experts note that the pre-existing process of enforcing intel-
lectual property rights in the general courts, even in simple cases
of outright piracy, was time-consuming and unreliable.75 In
71. See Chua, supra note 25, at 228 (stating that civil cases go before bench in
monthly installments and average case goes before court of general jurisdiction only
one day per month).
72. See id. at 228 (revealing that former Deputy Director General of Department of
Intellectual Property strongly criticized court of general jurisdiction for misapplying law
and not understanding concept of copyright).
73. See Wineburg, supra note 2, at 29 (stating that Asian courts award damages
slowly and infrequently); Chua, supra note 25, at 227 (noting that prior to Copyright
Act of 1994, fines for infringement were approximately US$80, and prior to Trademark
Act of 1991, fines for forgery were approximately US$240).
74. See Cine-Ads Video Co. v. Nai Mongkol Thainprathan [Crim. Ct.] No. 7388/
2530 (1987) (Thail.) (refusing to hold Thai defendant guilty of pirating U.S. films); see
also JOYCE, supra note 4, at 33 (describing back door method of receiving protection
under Berne Convention). Prior to the United States signing on to the Berne Conven-
tion, U.S. authors could simultaneously publish their works in a country that adhered to
the 1971 Paris Act or the 1948 Brussels Act of the Berne Convention and thus be pro-
tected under the Berne Convention. JOYCE, supra. Simultaneous publication in a Berne
member country, however, did not protect U.S. authors in countries that adhered to
the 1928 Rome Act of the Berne Convention. Id. at 32.
75. See Sujintaya, supra note 26 (describing difficulty in litigating intellectual prop-
erty rights before establishment of IPIT Court); Chua, supra note 25, at 228 (comment-
ing that civil and criminal enforcement faced many obstacles prior to IPIT Court). See
also Sujintaya, supra (explaining that practice of law in Thailand is among list of profes-
sions allowed only to Thai citizens under Alien Business Law (N.E.C. Announcement
No. 281), B.E. 2515 (1972)). When a foreign copyright, trademark, or patent holder
suspected infringement or pirating of his or her intellectual property, he or she would
contact a Thai law firm to pursue the matter. Sujintaya, supra. The Thai law firm would
then initiate an investigation by hiring a private detective agency to discover the neces-
sary facts to include in the complaint, which could take weeks or months. Id. When
finished, the attorney would present this complaint to the police department, which
would decide whether to issue a search warrant. Id. If the police granted a search
warrant, then an attorney would accompany them on the raid. Id. After the raid, the
police returned to the police station with both parties and the seized articles, which
could be the offending goods, the equipment by which they were produced, and any
documents. Id. There, the police would take statements from both parties and decide
whether to arrest the offender. Id. Frequently, the police only pursued cases of out-
right piracy. Id. Either way, the police then made their own investigation of the case.
Id. Again this stage could take months and stories abound regarding discontented
right-holders. Id. If the police determined there was sufficient cause to pursue the
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Thailand, unlike the United States, experts note that most for-
eign right-holders have preferred to file criminal charges rather
than civil causes of action.76 This preference is due in part to
the Thai Code of Civil Procedure. 77 Another deterrent in pursu-
ing a civil case is that upon receiving a civil complaint, the in-
fringer who operated a sole ownership business could simply
close shop and move. 78 While criminal actions allow for the im-
mediate termination of the infringing acts, interim injunctions
are seldom available in civil cases.79 Should a right-holder still
decide to pursue a civil complaint, a final adjudication, taking
into account the full appeal process, may require up to six
years.80
B. TRJPs and Enforcement Obligations
Scholars note that multinational treaties, bilateral negotia-
tions, and unilateral trade sanctions affected the development of
international intellectual property law.8 The United States and
other Western nations moved to unite international intellectual
matter, then they would turn the case over to a public prosecutor. Id. Once received
by a public prosecutor, the case would be handled as any other criminal case, because
there was not a special intellectual property section with built up expertise and back-
ground within the judiciary or prosecutor's office. Id.
76. See Vechayanon, supra note 23, at 33 (stating that increasing trend is to use
criminal process in intellectual property enforcement); Sujintaya, supra note 26 (re-
marking that criminal process is preferred because civil process is not practical in Thai-
land).
77. THAI CODE OF CMvL PROCEDURE (Thail.). See Sujintaya, supra note 26 (explain-
ing that complaining parties have avoided civil cases because complying with filing re-
quirements of Thai Code of Civil Procedure in intellectual property cases was ineffi-
cient). Sae Sujintaya revealed that the Thai Code of Civil Procedure requires that the
complaint in civil cases include all of the evidence. Id.; see also MARTINDALE-HUBBELL,
supra note 38, at THAI-7 (reporting that Thai courts generally do not employ pretrial
discovery procedures). Thus a civil complainant cannot expect to discover evidence to
support his allegations through interrogatories, broad requests for document produc-
tion, or discovery depositions. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra.
78. See Sujintaya, supra note 26 (revealing that sole ownership businesses are not
required to file for licenses that would make infringing owner easy to identify and lo-
cate).
79. See id. (commenting that courts require overwhelming evidence for interim
injunctions).
80. See Chua, supra note 25, at 228 (estimating that civil intellectual property cases
in courts of general jurisdiction required six years for final adjudication after full ap-
peal process).
81. See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: To-
ward a New Multilateralism, 76 IowA L. REv 273, 289 (1991) (noting that United States
uses multinational treaties, bilateral negotiations, and unilateral trade sanctions to af-
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property law with trade at the Uruguay Round12 of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade8 3 ("GATT"), which produced
TRIPs.84  TRIPs is the first multilateral intellectual property
agreement to prescribe comprehensive enforcement procedures
that its member countries must adopt.8 5
1. Pre-existing Intellectual Property Mechanisms
The United States has employed three approaches to en-
force its intellectual property interests in other countries, such as
Thailand: unilateral trade sanctions, bilateral negotiations, and
multilateral treaties administered by international agencies.86
Initially, the United States directed most of its efforts towards
unilateral trade sanctions under Section 301 of the Trade Act of
fect development of intellectual property laws in other nations); Wineburg, supra note
2, at 25 (remarking that formal diplomatic actions develop intellectual property rights).
82. WTO Agreement, supra note 9.
83. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. AS, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1950) [hereinafter GATT]. See About the WI'O, supra note
9 (remarking that international organization was created later). The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") was both an international agreement and an in-
ternational organization to support the agreement. About the WTO, supra. GATT was a
provisional agreement that governed much of world trade from 1948 to 1994. Id.
GAIT was aimed at reducing tariff concessions and providing trade rules. Id. It was
replaced by the WTO in the Uruguay Round of Negotiations, which culminated in
1994. Id.
84. See Cordray, supra note 62, at 135 (commenting that United States shifted its
efforts for intellectual property enforcement to Uruguay Round); Leaffer, supra note
81, at 277 (asserting that Uruguay Round of GATT was proposed to remedy deficient
international protection of intellectual property); Doane, supra note 2, at 466 (report-
ing that intellectual property rights protection was placed on negotiating agenda of
Uruguay Round due to persistence of U.S. business community and government).
85. See Thomas Dreier, TRIPs and the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in
FROM GATT TO TRIPs-THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 1, 2 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., Max Planck Insti-
tute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, 1996)
(commenting that before TRIPs formal and practical aspects of enforcement was left to
signatory states to determine); Ana Maria Pacon, What Will TRIPs Do for Developing
Countries?, in FROM GATT TO TRIPs-THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1, 2 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds.,
Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition
Law, 1996) (reporting that for first time international intellectual property convention
lays down detailed standards for procedures and litigation); Doane, supra note 2, at 428
(noting that TRIPs has enforcement measures); Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 5, at 191
(stating that TRIPs is first intellectual property treaty to introduce sanctions against
non-complying members).
86. See Leaffer, supra note 81, at 289 (stating that United States has fought piracy
through three-prong approach).
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197487 ("Section 301") and bilateral trade negotiations, such as
friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties. 88 Scholars note
that these approaches proved inadequate in many instances.89
Direct negotiations with developing nations often were unsuc-
cessful and made little headway because they created resentment
87. Tide III, Chapter 1, of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1988)
(Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988) [hereinafter Section 301]. See Ted
L. McDorman, U.S.-Thailand Trade Disputes: Applying Section 301 to Cigarettes and Intellec-
tual Property, 14 MICH.J. INT'L L. 90 (1992) (describing U.S. pressure and application of
trade sanctions against Thailand to provide greater protection for intellectual property
rights). According to Ted McDorman, the U.S. use of Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 ("Section 301") confers short-term economic benefits on the United States at the
cost of political goodwill. McDorman, supra. There is a growing resentment to the
United States and "significant opposition to Thailand's perceived capitulation to U.S.
pressure." Id. at 118. In 1987, this opposition reached its head when the Thai legisla-
ture refused to pass amendments to the Copyright Act of 1978 that were intended to
satisfy U.S. pressure. Id. The resulting political upheaval caused the government of
Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda to fall. See also Lee Siew Hua, New Thai Copyright
Law Comes into Force Today, STRAITs TIMES (Sing.), Mar. 21, 1995 (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal) (reporting that refusal of Members of Parliament to pass
copyright amendment bill caused downfall of Prem Tinsulanonda government);
O'Neill, supra note 50, at 617-22 (describing legislative and political history of Copy-
right Act).
88. See Patricia McKinstry Robin, Comment The Bit Won't Bite: The American Bilat-
eral Investment Treaty Program, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 931, 939 (1984) (explaining that friend-
ship, commerce, and navigation treaties are bilateral agreements that typically include
most-favored-nation treatment, establish terms of trade and shipping, and establish
rights of businesses of both countries to reside, do business, and own property within
jurisdiction of other state). According to Wineburg, the United States has used diplo-
matic and commercial pressures, including bilateral investment and friendship treaties,
on Asian countries to encourage the adoption of modern intellectual property laws, in
line with Western views of intellectual property. Wineburg, supra note 2, at 25. The
rationale behind the use of trade by the United States to convince Asian countries to
recognize and protect intellectual property rights as private property is that non-recog-
nition of intellectual property as private property results in a taking. Wineburg, supra,
at 26. Non-recognition, according to the U.S. view, serves as a non-tariff trade barrier
against U.S. citizens who wish to trade in their intellectual property. Id. But, Wineburg
posits, "[d]iplomatic techniques impose Western cultural values, and ignore, or pur-
posefully overlook, the culture and customs of the Asian countries." Id. at 25.
89. See O'Neill, supra note 50, at 616 (noting that U.S. bilateral action brought
about reform in three Asian nations, but not in Thailand); see also McDorman, supra
note 87, at 91 (stating that "use of Section 301 and Special Section 301 has put pressure
on Thailand to alter its laws and practices to provide greater protection for... intellec-
tual property."); Howley & Roman, supra note 13 (attributing Thailand's placement on
Section 301 Watch List in 1998 to high video and software piracy and failure to meet
standards of TRIPs patent protection). In 1998, the U.S. Trade Representative again
placed Thailand on the Section 301 Watch List due to Thailand's high level of intellec-
tual property infringement, despite the effectiveness of the IPIT Court and the institu-
tion of the new Copyright Act that grants higher levels of protection rights. Howley &
Roman, supra note 13.
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among developing nations that viewed them as a form of coloni-
alism.9" When bilateral persuasion proved ineffective, the
United States could impose unilateral trade sanctions.9" Protests
by developing nations, 9 2 however, illustrated that unilateral Sec-
tion 301 sanctions were problematic becaise they were potential
violations of U.S. responsibilities under GATT.93
The government also employed existing multinational ac-
cords to enforce higher levels of protection.94 Experts, however,
maintained that because the Berne Convention and the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property95 ("Paris
Convention") lacked dispute settlement procedures between
member countries, these Conventions could not pressure non-
conforming member countries to provide increased protection
of intellectual property rights.96 Rather, the Paris and Berne
90. See Leaffer, supra note 81, at 297 (alleging that bilateral agreements create
resentment among Third World countries who view them as species of colonialism); see
also D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 8, at 70 (quoting one Thai leader as saying that
United States is "not the world's big boss" in response to U.S. pressure on Thailand).
91. Leafier supra note 81, at 295; D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 8, at 386.
92. See Leaffer supra note 81, at 298 (reporting that Brazil claims U.S. Special 301
sanctions violate U.S. responsibilities under GATT); see also D'AmATO & LONG, supra
note 8, at 385 (claiming that U.S. use of Section 301 against Thailand for its high rate of
intellectual property infringement is problematic). First, Section 301 is difficult to legit-
imize because there has never been an apparent market in Thailand for legitimate U.S.
intellectual property. D'AMATO & LONG, supra, at 386. The U.S. Trade Representative,
therefore, is using Section 301 to coerce Thailand to pass laws that conform to U.S.
intellectual property norms rather than to protect U.S. manufacturers from lost sales.
Id. Thus, Section 301 interferes with sovereignty and ignores comity. Id. Second, ap-
plication of Section 301 is arguably unreasonable because when balancing the potential
harms, "it is clear that Thailand stood to lose far more than the United States stood to
gain." Id. Third, penalizing the Thai government and people when they lack the re-
sources to halt illegal pirating is different than when the government sanctions criminal
activity that has harmful effect within the United States. Id.
93. GATT, supra note 83.
94. See McDorman, supra note 87, at 107 (noting that United States pushed for
inclusion of international regime of intellectual property protection as part of GATT).
95. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as
last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter
Paris Convention].
96. See Cordray, supra note 62, at 131 (quoting NATIONAL SEcuRav & INT'L AFFAIRS
Div., GEN. AcCT. OFFICE, STRENGTHENING WORLDWIDE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 22 (1987) [hereinafter GAO Report] as stating that "knowledgeable
government officials agree that [existing multilateral intellectual property agreements]
do not contain effective provisions for challenging countries that do not meet their
obligations."); Romano, supra note 55, at 553, 558 (explaining that Berne and Paris
Conventions fail to include mechanisms for right-holders to resolve disputes and sanc-
tions to be applied against member states that do not uphold their obligations);
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Conventions relied on WIPO as an administering body. 97 Under
WIPO, disputes arising between member countries over WIPO
provision violations would be settled in the International Court
ofJustice9 s ("ICJ").9 Scholars note that the International Court
of Justice was viewed as an unreliable forum, in part due to its
slow pace. 00 After the developing nations moved to weaken the
provisions of WIPO, the United States ceased to view WIPO as
being capable of achieving its objectives of increased intellectual
property right protection and enforcement. 1° 1 Instead, the
United States shifted its focus towards lobbying for the inclusion
of an agreement on intellectual property as part of what would
become the WTO. 102
2. Formation of TRIPs
Because TRIPs is an annex of the WTO Agreement, all
WTO member countries that seek to benefit from the trade ben-
Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 5, at 191 (asserting that TRIPs is first international intel-
lectual property treaty to introduce system of sanctions against members who do not
comply); Leaffer, supra note 81, at 276 (declaring that neither Berne nor Paris Conven-
tions are effective against piracy in Third World nations).
97. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPs AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 9
(Sweet & Maxwell 1998) (stating that WIPO administers Paris and Berne Conventions).
98. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055.
The U.N. Charter established the International Court ofJustice [hereinafter ICJ] as the
primary judicial forum of the United Nation.
99. See Cordray, supra note 62, at 139 (commenting that WIPO conventions re-
quire bringing disputes before ICJ).
100. See John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for a
New Age, in INTERNATIONAL LAw 16, 20-21 (1999) (remarking that "[t ] he Court has been
hampered, however, by a perceived lack of bite."); Cordray, supra note 62, at 131 (not-
ing that ICJ dispute settlement process is too long, complex, and cumbersome). Ac-
cording to Monique Cordray, countries may declare themselves not to be bound by ICJ
jurisdiction. Cordray, supra. As of 1989, 26 members of the Paris Convention have
refused to accept ICJ jurisdiction and only 60 of the Berne Convention members are
subject to ICJ jurisdiction. Id.
101. See Doane, supra note 2, at 471 (reporting that at March 1980 Conference of
WIPO, developing countries attempted to pass proposals to weaken already inadequate
standards of protection in Paris Convention); Cordray, supra note 62, at 124 (citing
GAO Report that United States has actively opposed initiatives by developing nations to
weaken current international standards of national intellectual property protection in
WIPO). The GAO Report further states that "[t] he government sees greater opportu-
nity for broad substantive progress by addressing this problem as an unfair trade prac-
tice within the new 'Uruguay' GATT Round of multilateral negotiations." Cordray,
supra.
102. See Cordray, supra note 62, at 122 (claiming that one reason United States
shifted its efforts to GATT was because United States had more influence in GATT than
WIPO).
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efits conferred by the WTO must adhere to their TRIPs obliga-
tions."' TRIPs is the result of the efforts of many nations, led by
the United States, to connect intellectual property rights en-
forcement to international trade.1"4 The United States strove to
include intellectual property in international trade discussions
because it viewed intellectual property violations as distorting in-
ternational trade. 105
The United States specifically sought to have international
intellectual property rights protection included in the agenda of
the Uruguay Round of Negotiations of GATT, rather than rely
on the pre-existing mechanisms. 10 6 The developing nations ob-
jected to the inclusion of intellectual property as part of the
WTO and argued that WIPO was the proper forum.10 7 The
United States, however, preferred to pursue the WTO as a forum
because, unlike WIPO, WTO agreements contractually bind
governments to keep their policies within agreed limits, l08 the
103. TRIPs, supra note 10, art. 1 (1). Article 1 (1) states that "Members shall give
effect to the provisions of this Agreement." See Paul Katzenberger & Annette Kur,
TRIPs and Intellectual Property, in FROM GATT TO TRIPs-THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1, 2 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Ger-
hard Schricker eds., Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copy-
right and Competition Law, 1996) (noting that because TRIPs is component of WTO
Agreement, it is binding on all WTO members); Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Deveoping
Countries Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 759 (1996) (re-
marking that threat of trade sanctions provides incentive for TRIPs compliance).
104. See Doane, supra note 2, at 471 (asserting that United States and European
Community brought issue of intellectual property to attention of GATT's contracting
parties).
105. See id. at 466 (describing why United States views inadequate intellectual
property protection as leading to trade distortions); JOYCE, supra note 4, at 40 (stating
that "lax enforcement of the intellectual Property rights of foreign proprietors also
could be considered a means by which states shelter local companies from international
competition.").
106. See Doane, supra note 2, at 465 (maintaining that United States sought to
include protection for intellectual property in Uruguay Round due to growth in U.S.
exports of intellectual property products); Leaffer, supra note 81, at 276 (commenting
that United States decided that intellectual property protection must be sought
through new mechanism besides existing international intellectual property treaties).
107. See Doane, supra note 2, at 472 (stating that developing nations asserted that
inclusion of intellectual property rights exceeded GATT's mandate); Trevor Stevens &
Davies Collison Cave, Recent Trademark Developments: Asia/Pacific and Australia, 393
PRAc. L. INST.: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 329, 336 (1994) (noting that Thailand challenged legitimacy of intel-
lectual property as right and its inclusion in GATT, rather than remaining solely under
WIPO).
108. See About the WTO, supra note 9 (emphasizing that WTO Agreements are con-
tracts between member nations).
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WTO is equipped with its own dispute settlement mechanism
and with enforcement procedures,' 0 9 and the WTO is not sub-
ject to the same U.N.-style voting blocks as WIPO. °
Ultimately, the developing nations agreed to include negoti-
ations for an agreement on intellectual property rights in the
Uruguay Round."'1 The developing nations bargained for
greater market access and fair trade rules in specific industries in
exchange for providing greater intellectual property protec-
tion.' 12 They also bargained for a system requiring staggered
compliance, depending on a nation's level of development and
economy.1 13 These negotiations produced TRIPs,11 4 which estab-
lishes three transitional compliance periods for nations to meet
TRIPs obligations and minimum standards.1 5
109. See id. (remarking that dispute settlement mechanism is important aspect of
WTO); Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 5, at 191 (stating that TRIPs is first international
treaty to impose sanctions for failing to meet intellectual property protection mini-
mums).
110. See Cordray, supra note 62, at 137 (stating that WIPO voting block is similar to
those formed in other U.N. organizations). The U.N.-style voting block occurs when
less developed countries cast their votes together as a block "even if the result doesn't
adequately reflect the interests of some members." Id. (citing Frank Emmert, Intellec-
tual Property in the Uruguay Round-Negotiating Strategies of the Western Industrialized Coun-
tries, 11 MIcH. J. INr'L L. 1317, 1343 (1989)).
111. See Gervais, supra note 97, at 10-25 (describing history of negotiations to in-
clude intellectual property in WTO).
112. See Gana, supra note 103, at 739 (stating that developing countries' accession
to TRIPs was "bargained-for-exchange-intellectual property protection for fair trade
rules in specific industries ... ).
113. See Gervais, supra note 97, at 14 (citing Document MTN.TNC/11 dated Apr.
21, 1989 that stipulates that parties to negotiations agree to discuss transitional arrange-
ments).
114. TRIPs, supra note 10.
115. Id.; see GERVAIS, supra note 97, at 14 (noting that second "Draft Final Act Em-
bodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" sug-
gested three general transitional periods). The first deadline for compliance, which
applied to developed nations, was January 1, 1996. TRIPs, supra note 10, art. 65(1).
Article 65(1) allows that "no Member shall be obliged to apply the provisions of this
Agreement before the expiry of a general period of one year following the date of entry
into force of the Agreement Establishing the WTO." TRIPs, supra. The second dead-
line of January 1, 2000 applied to developing nations and nations whose economy is in
transition. Id. arts. 65(2), 65(3). Article 65(2) states that "[alny developing country
Member is entitled to delay for a further period of four years the date of application ...
of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles 3,4 and 5 of Part I." Id. Article
65(3) provides that "[a]ny other Member, which is in the process of transformation
from a centrally-planned into a market, free-enterprise economy ... may also benefit
from a period of delay as foreseen in paragraph 2 above." Id. The third deadline of
January 1, 2006 applies to countries on the U.N. list of least-developed nations. Id. art.
66. Article 66(1) allows that:
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Scholars question whether the obligations established by
TRIPs will permit developing nations to have intellectual prop-
erty systems that reflect their culture and values, or whether
these obligations will impose norms and mores of the industri-
ally developed nations." 6 First, because the rules regarding in-
tellectual property are in a state of development, the binding
obligations of TRIPs may create intellectual property laws in
member countries where none existed.' 7 Second, in addition
to requiring the recognition of minimum intellectual property
rights, TRIPs provides an international dispute settlement mech-
anism that allows member countries in good standing to exact
compensatory damages from other member countries that fail to
comply with their TRIPs obligations."'
In view of their special needs and requirements, and their economic, financial
and administrative constraints, and their need for flexibility to create a viable
technological base, least-developed country Members shall not be required to
apply the provisions of this Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 and 5, for a
period of 10 years from the date of application as defined under paragraph 1
of Article 65 above.
Id.
116. See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPs Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Over-
protective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 616 (1996) (predicting that TRIPs "will be one
of the most effective vehicles of Western imperialism in history.").
117. See Daniel Gervais, An Overview of TRPs: Historical and Current Issues, Remarks
at the Fordham University School of Law Seventh Annual Conference on International
Intellectual Property Law & Policy (Apr. 8-9, 1999) (transcript on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal) (noting that TRIPs binds WTO Member nations to provide
intellectual property rights and protections at specified minimum standards). Accord-
ing to Daniel Gervais:
The TRIPS Agreement obliges WTO Members to comply with the substantive
provisions of the Paris and Berne Conventions, in addition to the specific
("Paris-plus" and "Bern-plus") provisions of TRIPS itself .... [TI ogether they
ensure that no provision of TRIPS is interpreted to lower the level of protec-
tion existing before TRIPS .... The incorporation of Paris and Berne provi-
sions by reference into TRIPS allows WTO members to challenge other Mem-
bers' implementation of those provisions (as well as those added by TRIPS, of
course), using the WTO dispute-settlement mechanism.
Id.
118. See Cordray, supra note 62, at 133 (setting forth that GATT Article 23 allows
contracting parties to suspend concessions or other GATl obligations to offending par-
ties); see also Gana, supra note 103, at 773 (claiming that prevailing party in WTO dis-
pute is entitled to seek compensation or suspend concessions). According to Monica
Cordray, developing nations must relinquish their sovereign right to pursue their own
policies, which they adopted to stimulate indigenous creative action, if those policies
are inconsistent with TRIPs. Gana, supra, at 737. "TRIPs requires [that] member coun-
tries ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in TRIPs are made available
under national laws." Id. at 769. Developing nations, therefore, must conform to a
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3. Enforcement Obligations under TRIPs
The primary goal of TRIPs, as expressed in its preamble, is
to promote free trade by ensuring that member countries pro-
tect intellectual property rights, but not to such an extent as to
constitute a trade barrier.119 The principle that each member
country provides intellectual property protection for citizens of
other member countries is fundamental to TRIPs. 120 In pursuit
of this goal, TRIPs features minimum substantive standards, dis-
pute settlement between member countries, and enforcement
provisions.1 21
The first main feature of TRIPs is that member countries
pledge to conform to an internationally recognized minimum
level of standards.1 22 These minimum standards govern what
constitutes protected subject matter, what rights are to be con-
ferred and the allowable exceptions to those rights, and the du-
ration of protection.1 23 In order to determine at what level to set
these minimum standards, the drafters of TRIPs looked to the
existing international intellectual property treaties.1 24 TRIPs ex-
system and philosophy of laws and values that are alien and may be in direct conflict
with the historical framework which has sustained these societies. Id. at 770.
119. TRIPs, supra note 10, pmbl. The Preamble of TRIPs reads "[d]esiring to re-
duce trade distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account
the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights,
and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do
not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade . . . ." Id.
120. SeeJ.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection
Under TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INr'L LAw. 345, 348 (1995) (emphasiz-
ing that principle of equal treatment under domestic laws is important basic principle
of TRIPs).
121. See An Overview of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) (visited Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.wto.org> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Overview] (reporting that three main
features of TRIPs are standards, enforcement, and dispute settlement); Gana, supra
note 103, at 759 (noting that "[t]he impetus behind the TRIPs Agreement is a combina-
tion of two inextricable objectives: (1) to secure global economic rewards of an intel-
lectual property grant, and (2) to facilitate the enforcement of these rights as a means
to accomplish the first objective.").
122. See Overview, supra note 121 (citing adherence to minimum standards as one
main feature of TRIPs).
123. See id. (defining aspects that are covered by minimum standards).
124. See Other Intellectual Property Conventions Incorporated by Reference into the TRIPs
Agreement (visited Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.wto.org> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal) (declaring that TRIPs references provisions of Paris, Berne, and
other intellectual property conventions); Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 5, at 191 (re-
marking that TRIPs requires members to comply with substantive rules of Paris Conven-
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pressly incorporates the substantive obligations of WIPO, the
Paris Convention, and the Berne Convention. 125 It, however, ex-
pressly does not incorporate the Berne Convention's moral
rights provision. 1 6 Furthermore, TRIPs provides for additional
obligations to cover areas that are either unanticipated by the
pre-existing conventions or purposefully omitted. 127
The second significant feature of TRIPs, because it is an in-
tegral part of the WATO Agreement, is the dispute settlement
mechanism of the WTO, which governs disputes arising between
member countries due to noncompliance with their TRIPs obli-
gations.1 2' All member countries promise to conform to the
minimum standards set out by TRIPs, subject to their transition
periods. 129  Member countries, however, are free to provide
tion); GERVAIS, supra note 97, at 97 (revealing that TRIPs negotiators opted to adopt
existing rules).
125. TRIPs, supra note 10, arts. 2(1), 9(1). Article 2(1) states that "Members shall
comply with Articles 1-12 and 19 of the Paris Convention (1967)." Id. Article 9(1)
provides that "Members shall comply with Articles 1-21 and the Appendix of the Berne
Convention (1971)." Id.
126. Id. art. 9(1). Article 9(1) notes that "[h]owever, Members shall not have
rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under
Article 6bis of that Convention or the rights derived therefrom." Id.; see GERVAIS, supra
note 97, at 71-79 (detailing drafting history of decision to omit moral rights obliga-
tions).
127. TRIPs, supra note 10, arts. 8(1), 71(1). Article 8(1) reads, "[a]ppropriate
measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may
be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right-holders or the
resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the interna-
tional transfer of technology." Id. Article 71(1) allows that "[t]he Council may also
undertake reviews in the light of any relevant new developments which might warrant
modifications or amendment of this Agreement." Id. See Doane, supra note 2, at 474
(describing how TRIPs allows for developments in technology that may warrant modifi-
cation or amendment to TRIPs).
128. See Overview, supra note 121 (contending that TRIPs makes member nations
subject to WTO dispute settlement procedures with respect to intellectual property);
Karen D. Lee & Silke von Lewinski, The Settlement of International Disputes in the Field of P,
in FROM GATT TO TRIPS-THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTs 278, 312 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law,
1996) (reasoning that as one of WTO's multilateral agreements, WTO dispute settle-
ment procedures apply to TRIPs).
129. See The Honourable Mr. Justice Laddie, TRIPs: A Critical View, Remarks at the
Fordham University School of Law Seventh Annual Conference on International Intel-
lectual Property Law & Policy (Apr. 8-9, 1999) (transcript on file with the Fordham Inter-
national LawJournal) (stating that "all countries are expected to adopt intellectual prop-
erty laws which contain the TRIPs provisions . . ."). Justice Laddie further notes that
"[a]lthough TRIPs is designed to impose a uniform intellectual property code, it has
not been uniformly welcomed." Id.
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more extensive intellectual property protection than TRIPs pro-
vides and to determine which methods are appropriate for im-
plementing the provisions of the agreement. 30
The requirements regarding intellectual property enforce-
ment through domestic procedures and remedies are the third
important feature of TRIPs."' Besides ensuring that right-hold-
ers have an effective means of enforcing their rights, the agree-
ment seeks to ensure that the domestic procedures employed by
member countries are not applied in a manner that creates bar-
riers to legitimate trade.1 12 In furtherance of this goal, Part III
of TRIPs designates the enforcement procedures that member
countries are required to provide. 33 The first section presents
the general principals for all enforcement procedures.134 The
remaining four sections detail what procedures and remedies
must be available for right-holders to obtain effective enforce-
ment against violators.' 35 In the second section, TRIPs requires
the creation of certain civil and administrative procedures and
remedies.13 6 The third section discusses provisional remedies. 13 7
Special requirements related to border measures are covered in
the forth section.1 38 The fifth section determines when criminal
130. See Overview, supra note 121 (explaining that TRIPs is minimum standards
agreement, which allows member nations to provide more extensive protection of intel-
lectual property).
131. TRIPs, supra note 10, Part III, §§ 1-5, arts. 41-61. Part III is titled "Enforce-
ment of Intellectual Property Rights."
132. Id. art. 41; see Overview, supra note 121 (asserting that member nations have
general obligations not to apply procedures in such manner that they will hinder
trade). The relevant language in Article 41 (1) provides that "[t]hese procedures shall
be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and
to provide for safeguards against their abuse." Overview, supra.
133. TRIPs, supra note 10, Part III, §§ 1-5, arts. 41-61. Article 41(1) requires that
"[m] embers shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are avail-
able under their national laws ... ." Id. art. 41(1)
134. Id. Part III, § 1, art. 41. Section 1 of Part III is tiled "General Obligations."
135. See Overview, supra note 121 (declaring that after Section 1, following sections
deal with civil and administrative procedures and remedies, provisional measures, bor-
der measures, and criminal procedures).
136. TRIPs, supra note 10, Part III, § 2, art. 42-49. Section 2 of Part III is tided
"Civil and Administrative Procedures and Remedies." Id.
137. Id. Part III, § 3, art. 50. Section 3 of Part III is titled "Provisional Measures."
Id.
138. Id. Part III, § 4, arts. 51-60. Section 4 of Part III is tiled "Special Require-
ments Related to Border Measures."
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procedures shall be available.13
9
Scholars note that the basic objective of the first section,
which states the general obligations, is the guarantee of due pro-
cess. 4 TRIPs requires that the enforcement procedures should
not be overly complicated or costly and should not include any
unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays.1 4 ' TRIPS also
directs that the courts issue written decisions that are available to
both parties without undue delay. x4 2 The courts must base their
decisions on the merits of the case and on evidence that both
parties had the opportunity to dispute. 4 The parties must also
have the opportunity for judicial review of final administrative
decisions and appeals on matters of law of an initial court deci-
sion, subject to a member country's jurisdictional provisions.'
Member countries, however, are not obligated to create a special
court or to allocate resources for the enforcement for intellec-
tual property rights.1 4 1
The second section imparts civil and administrative proce-
dures and remedies.1 4 6 Articles 42 and 43 discuss the civil, judi-
cial, and evidentiary procedures that each member country must
139. Id. Part III, § 5, art. 61. Section 5 of Part III is titled "Criminal Procedures."
Id.
140. See Overview, supra note 121 (contending that goal of first three paragraphs is
to guarantee due process).
141. TRIPs, supra note 10, art. 41(2). Article 41(2) states that "[p]rocedures con-
cerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be fair and equitable.
They shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-lim-
its or unwarranted delays." Id.
142. See id. art. 41(3) (providing that "[d]ecisions on the merits of a case shall
preferably be in writing and reasoned. They shall be made available at least to the
parties to the proceeding without undue delay.").
143. See id. (ordering that "[d]ecisions on the merits of a case shall be based only
on evidence in respect of which parties were offered the opportunity to be heard.").
144. Id. art. 41 (4). Article 41 (4) requires that "[p]arties to a proceeding shall have
an opportunity for review by a judicial authority of final administrative decisions and,
subject to jurisdictional provisions in national laws concerning the importance of a
case, of at least the legal aspects of initial judicial decisions on the merits of a case." Id.
145. Id. art. 41(5). Article 41(5) recognizes that:
[T]his Part does not create any obligation to put in place ajudicial system for
the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the en-
forcement of laws in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Members to
enforce their laws in general. Nothing in this Part creates any obligation with
respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual
property rights and the enforcement of laws in general.
Id.
146. Id. Part III, § 2, arts. 42-49.
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establish. 47 The fair and equitable procedures mandated by Ar-
ticle 42 provide that the defendant has the right to timely and
sufficiently detailed written notice, that all parties are allowed
independent legal counsel, that all parties have the right to sub-
stantiate their claims, and that the court shall provide protection
for confidential information. 48 Article 43 grants courts the au-
thority to order a limited discovery, in particular, that the oppos-
ing party produce specified evidence once the moving party
proves this evidence is relevant to substantiate the claim and is
within the opposing party's control.149 Additionally, a member
country may grant the court the authority to determine a case
based on the information presented, even if it is unsubstanti-
ated, once the opposing party has had an opportunity to be
heard, yet voluntarily refuses access to the necessary informa-
tion.1 50
Articles 44 through 47 empower judicial authorities to grant
injunctions, award damages, order the disposal of infringing
147. Id. arts. 42, 43. Article 42 is titled "Fair and Equitable Procedures." Id. art.
42. Article 43 is titled "Evidence of Proof." Id. art. 43.
148. Id. art. 42. Article 42 requires that "Members shall make available to right-
holders civil judicial procedures ... ." Id. Article 42 also states that:
[d]efendants shall have the right to written notice .... Parties shall be al-
lowed to be represented by independent legal counsel, and procedures shall
not impose overly burdensome requirements concerning mandatory personal
appearances. All parties shall be duly entitled to substantiate their claims and
to present all relevant evidence. The procedure shall provide a means to iden-
tify and protect confidential information, unless this would be contrary to ex-
isting constitutional requirements.
Id.
149. Id. art. 43(1). Article 43(1) provides that:
The judicial authorities shall have the authority, where a party has presented
reasonably available evidence sufficient to support its claims and has specified
evidence relevant to substantiation of its claims which lies in the control of the
opposing party, to order that this evidence be produced by the opposing
party, subject in appropriate cases to conditions which ensure the protection
of confidential information.
Id.
150. Id. art. 43(2). Article 43(2) instructs that:
In cases in which a party to a proceeding voluntarily and without good reason
refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide necessary information within a
reasonable period, or significantly impedes a procedure relating to an en-
forcement action, a Member may accord judicial authorities the authority to
make preliminary and final determinations.., on the basis of the information
presented to them, including the complaint or the allegation presented by the
party adversely affected by the denial of access to information ....
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goods, and provide the right-holder with a right of informa-
tion.1 5 ' Article 44 requires that courts have the ability to order
injunctions, but does not require them to do so when the ac-
cused infringer acted in good faith. 1 52 Article 45 states that the
courts must also be able to award damages adequate to compen-
sate the right-holder for his or her injury and to award expenses,
including attorney's fees."' Even when the infringer acted in
good faith, a member country may grant the judicial authorities
the power to award the recovery of profits.15 4 In order to punish
the infringer and deter future violations, Article 46 declares that
courts have the authority to order the disposal of infringing
goods outside the channels of commerce or their destruction
without compensation of any sort to the infringer. 15 5 To further
deter intellectual property rights violations, Article 47 is aimed at
151. Id. arts. 44-47. Article 44 is titled "Injunctions." Id. art. 44. Article 45 is titled
"Damages." Id. art. 45. Article 46 is titled "Other Remedies." Id. art. 46. Article 47 is
titled "Right of Information." Id. art. 47.
152. TRIPs, supra note 10, art. 44. Article 44(1) states that:
The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party to desist from
and infringement .... Members are not obliged to accord such authority in
respect of protected subject matter acquired or ordered by a person prior to
knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that dealing in such subject
matter would entail the infringement of an intellectual property right.
Id.
153. Id. art. 45. Article 45(1), concerning damages, requires that "[t]he judicial
authorities shall have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right-holder dam-
ages adequate to compensate for the injury the right-holder has suffered . . .by an
infringer who knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing
activity." Id.
154. Id. art. 45(2). Article 45(2), concerning expenses, mandates that:
The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the infringer to pay
the right-holder expenses, which may include appropriate attorney's fees. In
appropriate cases, Members may authorize the judicial authorities to order
recovery of profits and/or payment of pre-established damages even where the
infringer did not know or had no reasonable grounds to know that he was
engaged in infringing activity.
Id.
155. Id. art. 46. Article 46, concerning other remedies, provides that:
In order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial authori-
ties shall have the authority to order that goods that they have found to be
infringing be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of outside the chan-
nels of commerce.., or ... destroyed. The judicial authorities shall also have
the authority to order that materials and implements the predominant use of
which had been in the creation of the infringing goods be, without compensa-
tion of any sort, disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a man-
ner as to minimize the risks of further infringements.
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assisting the intellectual property right-holder to find the source
of the infringing goods.156 Under Article 47, member countries
have the discretion to provide their judicial authorities with the
power to order the infringer to inform the right-holder of the
identity of third parties involved in the production and distribu-
tion of the infringing goods. 157
In order to prevent abuse and to promote due process, Arti-
cle 48 provides indemnification for the wrongly-accused defend-
ant.158 It states that where an applicant has abused the enforce-
ment procedures to enjoin a party wrongly, the court shall have
the authority to order the applicant to pay adequate compensa-
tion and the defendant's expenses, which may include appropri-
ate attorney's fees. 159 Public authorities and officials who have
acted in good faith to administer any intellectual property en-
forcement measures, however, are exempt from liability.16 °
The third section of Part III supplies provisional measure
requirements that comply with the general obligation of expedi-
tious enforcement remedies.' 6 ' The twin aims of the provisional
measures are to prevent infringement from occurring, especially
by preventing infringing goods from entering into the channels
of commerce, and to preserve evidence relevant to proving an
alleged infringement.'62 Generally, the member countries must
156. See GERVAIS, supra note 97, at 210 (remarking that Article 47 allows judicial
authorities to order infringer to reveal his partners, sources, and clients).
157. TRIPs, supra note 10, art. 47. Article 47 allows that "Members may provide
that the judicial authorities shall have the authority ... to order the infringer to inform
the right-holder of the identity of third persons involved in the productions and distri-
bution of infringing goods or services and of their channels of distribution." Id.
158. Id. art. 48. Article 48 is entitled "Indemnification of the Defendant." Id.; see
Overview, supra note 121 (remarking that Article 48 contains safeguards against abuse of
enforcement process).
159. Id. art. 48(1). Article 48(1) requires that:
The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party at whose re-
quest measures were taken and who has abused enforcement procedures to
provide to a party wrongfully enjoined or restrained adequate compensation
for the injury suffered because of such abuse. The judicial authorities shall
also have the authority to order the applicant to pay the defendant expenses,
which may include appropriate attorney's fees.
Id.
160. Id. art. 48(2). Article 48(2) mandates that "[ iun respect of the administration
of any law pertaining to the protection or enforcement of intellectual property rights,
Members shall only exempt both public authorities and officials from liability to appro-
priate remedial measures where actions are taken or intended in good faith .... " Id.
161. Id. Part III, § 3. Section 3 of part III is entitled "Provisional Measures." Id.
162. Id. art. 50(1). Article 50(1) explains that the provisional measures are "to
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grant their judicial authorities the power to order prompt and
effective provisional measures.113  TRIPs specifically requires
member countries to provide inaudita altera parte164 measures
that allow court action without notice to the other side if any
delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the right-holder or if
there is a demonstrable risk of evidentiary destruction. 165 Addi-
tionally, a court must have the power to confirm that the appli-
cant is the right-holder and that infringement of the right is im-
minent or occurring before ordering provisional measures.1 66
Paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 50 permit the court to require the
applicant to provide a security deposit to protect the defendant
and prevent abuse, any reasonably available evidence, and any
information necessary to identify the goods.' 67 Once the court
grants an inaudita altera parte measure, it shall notify the affected
party without delay.'68 The party then has the right to a hearing
on whether the measures should be modified, revoked, or con-
firmed. 169 If the right-holder fails to initiate proceedings, how-
ever, then the measures will be revoked and the right-holder will
prevent an infringement of any intellectual property right from occurring, and in par-
ticular to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce ... [and] to preserve rele-
vant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement." Id.
163. Id. art. 50(1). Article 50(1) states that "[t]he judicial authorities shall have
the authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures .... " Id.
164. See William Whitaker, Words by William Whitaker (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http://
www.lysy2.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/word.exe> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) (defining inaudita altera parte as Latin phrase meaning out of hearing of
other party).
165. TRIPs, supra note 10, art. 50(2). Article 50(2) declares that "[t]he judicial
authorities shall have the authority to adopt provisional measures inaudita altera parte
where appropriate, in particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to
the right-holder, or where there is a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed."
Id.
166. Id. art. 50(3). Article 50(3) states that " [t]he judicial authorities shall have
the authority to require the applicant to provide any reasonably available evidence in
order to satisfy themselves.., that the applicant is the right-holder and that his right is
being infringed or that such infringement is imminent." Id.
167. Id. arts. 50(3), 50(5). Article 50(3) requires that the court have the authority
"to order the applicant to provide a security or equivalent assurance sufficient to pro-
tect the defendant and to prevent abuse." Id. art. 50(3). Article 50(5) allows that
"[t] he applicant may be required to supply other information necessary for the identifi-
cation of the goods .... " Id. art. 50(5).
168. Id. art. 50(4). Article 50(4) orders that "the parties affected shall be given
notice, without delay after the execution of the measures at the latest. A review, includ-
ing a right to be heard, shall take place upon the request of the defendant [to deter-
mine] whether these measures shall be modified, revoked or confirmed." Id.
169. Id. art. 50(4).
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be liable to compensate the affected party for any injury.170
The last section of Part III requires member countries to
provide criminal procedures and remedies to sanction certain
intellectual property right violators.17' According to TRIPs,
those who operate on a commercial scale and willfully commit
trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy must be subject to
criminal procedures. 172 It is up to the discretion of the member
countries, however, whether to subject other commercial, willful
infringement cases to criminal proceedings. 173
II. THAILAND'S ACT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AND
PROCEDURE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COURT
In October of 1997, the Thai National Assembly174 passed
the Act for the Establishment of and Procedure for Intellectual
Property and International Trade Court ("Act") .17 As a special-
ized court of first instance, the IPIT Court is not a new phenom-
enon in Thailand. 76 The Thai government established the IPIT
170. Id. arts. 50(6), 50(7). Article 50(6) states that "provisional measures... shall,
upon request of the defendant, be revoked or otherwise cease to have effect, if proceed-
ings leading to a decision on the merits of the case are not initiated within a reasonable
period .... " Id. art. 50(6). Article 50(7) also provides that:
Where the provisional measures are revoked or where they lapse due to any
act or omission by the applicant, or where it is subsequently found that there
has been no infringement... the judicial authorities shall have the authority
to order the applicant, upon request of the defendant, to provide the defend-
ant appropriate compensation for any injury caused by these measures.
Id. art. 50(7).
171. Id. Part III, § 5. Section 5 of Part III is entitled "Criminal Procedures." Id.
172. Id. art. 61. Article 61 mandates that "Members shall provide for criminal pro-
cedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting
or copyright piracy on a commercial scale." Id.
173. Id. art. 61. Article 61 also provides that "Members may provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual
property rights, in particular where they are committed willfully and on a commercial
scale." Id.
174. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 38, at THAI-1 (describing Thailand's
government as constitutional monarchy since 1932). The Thai National Assembly
holds legislative power and is comprised of a Senate and House of Representatives. Id.
175. Acr, supra note 17.
176. See Mattei, supra note 40 (mentioning history of specialized courts in Thai
judicial system). According to Mr. Fabrice Mattei, the Act Concerning the Organiza-
tion of the Courts (1908) established the first International Court in Thailand, which
had jurisdiction over matters involving the citizens of certain nations that had treaties
with Thailand. Id. Thai and European judges presided over the first International
Court. Id. The Thai National Assembly had already passed legislation to establish two
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Court to provide a mechanism to satisfy its TRIPs obligations.
177
A. The Formation of the Intellectual Property and
International Trade Court
The goal of the IPIT Court is to provide enhanced intellec-
tual property enforcement. 178 The IPIT Court is a separate and
specialized court convened to consider intellectual property
cases. 179 The IPIT Court employs specially trained judges, its
own court rules, unique procedures, such as hearings without
adjournments, and equitable remedies, such as preliminary in-
junctions.' 80
1. The Background of the Act
On December 1, 1997, a Royal Decree inaugurated the IPIT
other specialized courts of first instance-the Labour Court and the Tax Court. THE
ACT FOR THE SETTING UP OF LABOUR COURTS AND PROCEDURE FOR LABOUR CASES, B.E.
2522 (1979) (Thail.). THE ACT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TAX COURTS AND PROCE-
DURE FOR TAX CASES, B.E. 2526 (1985) (Thail.).
177. See Akarawit Sumawong, The Role of the Central Intellectual Property and Interna-
tional Trade Court, Remarks at the Fordham University School of Law Seventh Annual
Conference on International Intellectual Property Law & Policy 1 (Apr. 8-9, 1999)
(transcript on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (asserting that establish-
ment of IPIT Court is Thailand's answer to TRIPs enforcement obligations); see also
Vechayanon, supra note 23, at 30 (declaring that Thailand has improved intellectual
property laws and created IPIT Court to provide adequate protection for intellectual
property rights in response to WTO).
178. See Vechayanon, supra note 23, at 39 (contending that IPIT Court testifies to
Thailand's commitment to create effective system of protecting intellectual property
rights); see also Sujintaya, supra note 26 (describing IPIT Court as proof of Thailand's
efforts to lower rate of intellectual property infringement).
179. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 38, at THAI-9 (explaining that IPIT
Court is separate from courts of general jurisdiction); see also Robert Holleyman, Copy-
right Protection for Computer Software: A Global Overview, 416 PRAc. L. INST.: PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 313, 319
(1995) (stating that Thai government wished to establish specialized court to consider
intellectual property cases).
180. See Interview with Dr. Suthiphon Thaveechaiyagarn, Associate Judge, Secre-
tary of the Court, The Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, in
Bangkok, Thail. (June 15, 1999) (commenting on unique features of IPIT Court);
Pimvimol (June) Vipamaneerut, Intellectual Property and International Trade Court (visited
Oct. 25, 1999) <http://www.tillekeandgibbins.com> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) (explaining that IPIT Court hearings do not adjourn, judges have
expertise in intellectual property, and ChiefJustice of IPIT Court may stipulate rules for
court procedure); see also Rupert Ross-MacDonald, U: Thai IPR Developments-March
1997-March 1998, MONDAQ BUSINESS BREWING, June 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL
9017769 (stating that IPIT Court employs judges with intellectual property experience
and utilizes exceptional procedures).
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Court.18' The Thai Government undertook this effort in large
part as a result of its negotiations with the United States and the
European Union. 8 2 The U.S. Trade Representative had been
actively involved in an ongoing discourse with the Thai Ministry
of Commerce for increased intellectual property protection and
enforcement. 183 In 1992, the Thai Ministry of Commerce estab-
lished the Department of Intellectual Property, a separate de-
partment within the Ministry charged with handling these dis-
cussions.' 8 4 The European Union, under its WTO cooperation
commitment, 8 5 sent a mission to Thailand to assist in the pro-
cess of improving Thailand's intellectual property enforcement
procedures. 186 One of the changes in Thai enforcement, for
which the European Union Mission called, was the establish-
ment of a separate court.' 87 Article 41(5) of TRIPs, however,
does not require the establishment of a separate intellectual
181. Acr, supra note 17, pmbl. See Thailand Establishes International Trade Court,
PROJEcr & TRiaDE FIN., Mar. 10, 1998, at 15 (reporting that Thailand established intel-
lectual property and international trade court with exclusive jurisdiction for intellectual
property matters).
182. See Vichai Ariyanuntaka, Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement in the
Light of TRIPs and Specializd Intellectual Property Court in Thailand, in THE INTELLECrUAL
PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW FORUM: SPECIAL ISSUE 1998 10, 14 (1998)
(contending that U.S.-Thai negotiations and E.U.-Thai negotiations prompted Thai-
land to establish IPIT Court).
183. See O'Neill, supra note 50, at 614 (noting that since 1984, U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative may independently institute actions under Section 301). In 1988, the U.S.
Trade Representative cut Thailand's Generalized System of Preferences benefits by
US$165 million when Thailand failed to provide "adequate and effective protection for
U.S. intellectual property rights." Id. at 606; see also Telephone Interview with Shawn
Murphy, U.S. Trade Representative (Oct. 21, 1999) (admitting that U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative pressed for separate intellectual property court).
184. See Sumawong, supra note 177, at 2 (reporting that Department of Intellec-
tual Property began working on increasing Thai intellectual property protection before
end of Uruguay Round Negotiations); see also Investment Climate 1997, supra note 16
(noting creation of Department of Intellectual Property within Ministry of Commerce);
Chua, supra note 25, at 229 (stating that Thai government has centralized management
of intellectual property matters in Department of Intellectual Property).
185. See Technical Cooperation in the TRIPs Area (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http://
www.wto.org/about/facts7.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
(noting that Article 67 requires developed nation Members to provide technical and
financial cooperation to developing and least-developed nations to bring their intellec-
tual property systems into compliance with TRIPs).
186. See Finance: Call for Property Court, NATION, Apr. 25, 1998 (stating that Euro-
pean Union mission offered technical and financial assistance to Thailand for cam-
paign to improve suppression of intellectual property violations).
187. See id. (reporting that European Union urged Thailand to establish separate
intellectual property court).
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property court or the allocation of resources by member coun-
tries.188 Thailand, by establishing the IPIT Court, has surpassed
its obligations under TRIPs.'8 9 The final form of the Act was the
result of ajoint effort by the Ministry of Commerce and the Min-
istry of Justice, which administers the Thai judicial system.190
2. Jurisdiction
The IPIT Court has original jurisdiction over intellectual
property and international trade matters.' 91 The drafters of the
Act chose to combine jurisdiction over intellectual property and
international trade in one court as a response to the negotia-
tions with the United States and the European Union. 9 2 The
grouping of intellectual property and international trade also
ensures that the enforcement of intellectual property laws will
not be at the expense of legitimate trade, in accordance to Arti-
cle 41(1) of TRIPs.'9 3
188. TRIPs, supra note 10, art. 41(5). Article 41(5) states that "[i]t is understood
that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial system for the
enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of
laws in general .... " Id.
189. See Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 14 (stating that Thailand is exceeding its
obligation under TRIPs).
190. See id. (revealing that Act for the Establishment of and Procedure for Intellec-
tual Property and International Trade Court ("Act") was joint effort by Thai Ministries
of Justice and Commerce after negotiations with United States and European coun-
tries).
191. Acr, supra note 17, § 8. Section 8 states that "[o]nce an intellectual property
and international trade court is inaugurated, no other courts of first instance shall ac-
cept a case that falls under the jurisdiction of the intellectual property and interna-
tional trade courts for adjudication." Id.; see Sumawong, supra note 18 (remarking that
IPIT Court has exclusive jurisdiction because intellectual property and international
trade cases are different from ordinary civil and criminal cases). No other court of first
instance may hear civil or criminal cases regarding trademarks, copyrights, patents, li-
censing and technology transfer agreements, international sale, exchange of goods or
financial instruments, international services, carriage, and insurance, inward and out-
ward remittance of funds, trust receipts and guarantees, ship arrests, dumping and sub-
sidization of goods or services from abroad, layout-designs of integrated circuits, scien-
tific discoveries, trade names and geographical indicators, trade secrets, and plant vari-
eties. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 38, at THAI-9.
192. See Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 14 (stating that grouping of intellectual
property and international trade was to create user-friendly forum and Act was culmina-
tion of negotiations between European Nations, Thailand, and United States that
wished to facilitate needs of their nationals doing business in Thailand).
193. See Sumawong, supra note 18 (remarking that twin jurisdictions of IPIT Court
provide assurance that intellectual property enforcement will not be at expense of in-
ternational trade); see also The Central Intellectual Property and International Trade
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The Act, however, does not limit the IPIT Court's jurisdic-
tion to only intellectual property and international trade
cases. 194 Section 35 claims that when a single act gives rise to
several offenses, one of which is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the IPIT Court, the IPIT Court may exercise jurisdiction over
all the offenses.19 Similarly, Section 36 asserts that in situations
where several offenses arise from related acts, including one
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the IPIT Court, the IPIT
Court may decide whether to extend its jurisdiction.1 96
3. Judges
In order to best handle its caseload, the IPIT Court employs
two classes of specially trained judges-career judges and associ-
ate judges.1 97 Prior to the establishment of the IPIT Court, intel-
lectual property cases were heard by non-specialized judges,
which often resulted in misapplications of the law and, more-
over, misunderstandings of basic intellectual property con-
cepts. 198 A career judge must have competent knowledge in in-
tellectual property or international trade in order to be qualified
Court 1 (1997) (pamphlet, on file with author) (calling IPIT Court "a new dimension
for the promotion of foreign investment and trade.").
194. See Thaveechaiyagarn, supra note 180 (noting that restructure of intellectual
property or international trade companies may be brought before IPIT Court rather
than Bankruptcy Court).
195. Acr, supra note 17, § 35. Section 35 provides that "[i]n a criminal charge
where a single act violates several offences and one of offences falls within the jurisdic-
tion of the intellectual property and international trade court, the court shall also ac-
cept other offences for adjudication." Id.
196. Id. § 36. Section 36 specifies that:
In a criminal case where several related offences are filed in the same charge,
and some of the offences are not within the jurisdiction of the intellectual
property and international trade court, the court may accept all offences for
adjudication or reject any one or more of the offences which falls outside its
jurisdiction so that the prosecutor may file a new charge with the competent
court. In reaching its decision, the court shall regard convenience and fair-
ness as its prime consideration.
Id.
197. See Sumawong, supra note 177, at 4 (stating that IPIT Court bench includes
career judges with law degrees and associate judges who are specialists in intellectual
property or international trade from private and public sector); see also Mattei, supra
note 40 (stating that professional and associate Thai judges with special expertise will
compose IPIT Court bench).
198. See Chua, supra note 25, at 228 (revealing that former Deputy Director Gen-
eral of Department of Intellectual Property strongly criticized court for misapplying law
and not understanding concept of copyright).
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to serve on the bench of the IPIT Court.199 Frequently, judges
have completed further legal studies in the common law systems
of the United States or the United Kingdom.20  The Court also
employs associate judges, who are lay experts in intellectual
property or international trade legal matters. 20 1 Often, associate
judges are attorneys who specialize in these fields and have also
received a graduate law degree in the United States or its
equivalent in the United Kingdom.20 2 The associate judges are
appointed in accord with the Ministry Regulations20 3 for a pe-
riod of five years.20 4 Cases are heard before two career judges
and one associate judge.20 ' The IPIT Court, however, may also
empower the officers of another court to examine evidence on
its behalf.20 6 As an additional aid to provide the expertise that
these cases frequently require, the Act grants the IPIT Court the
authority to call on any knowledgeable person or expert.2 7
199. Acr, supra note 17, § 14. Section 14 provides that "Ujiudges of the intellectual
property and international trade court shall be appointed by the King from the judicial
officials under the Law on Judicial Service who possess competent knowledge of the
matters relating to intellectual property or international trade." Id.
200. See Sumawong, supra note 177, at 2 (reporting that Ministry of Justice sent
many judges abroad to further their training in intellectual property law).
201. AcT, supra note 17, § 15(3). Section 15(3) requires that associate judges shall
"hav[e] been trained on the purposes of the intellectual property and international
trade court and on the judicial duties in accordance with the rules and methods pre-
scribed in the Ministerial Regulations .... ." Id.; see Thaveechaiyagarn, supra note 180
(revealing that associate judges can be lay specialists in intellectual property or interna-
tional trade).
202. See Sumawong, supra note 177, at 4 (declaring that most judges of IPIT Court
have law degrees from both Thai and non-Thai universities and are fluent in English);
see also Thaveechaiyagarn, supra note 180 (commenting that he and several otherjudges
hold advanced law degrees from countries other than Thailand).
203. MINISTERIAL REGULATIONS, B.E. 2540 (1997) (Thail).
204. AcT, supra note 17, § 15. Section 15 specifies that:
Associate judges shall be appointed by the King from intellectual property or
international trade proficients [sic] selected by the Judicial Service Commis-
sion under the Law on Judicial Service, in accordance with the rules and meth-
ods prescribed in the Ministerial Regulations .... Each associate judge shall
hold office for a term of five years, but may be reappointed by the King.
Id.
205. See Sumawong, supra note 177, at 4 (noting that quorum requirement of two
career judges and one associate judge is "double guarantee of specialization").
206. Acr, supra note 17, § 21. Section 21 allows, "[w]here the intellectual property
and international trade court deems appropriate, it may empower another court or its
court officer to examine any evidence on its behalf. The examination of such evidence
may be conducted in or outside the court." Id.
207. Id. § 31. Section 31 states that "[t]he intellectual property and international
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4. Rules for Intellectual Property and
International Trade Cases
Scholars reveal that one of the most notable aspects of the
Act is the amount of discretion and authority it gives to the
judges.2 °8 In Section 30, the Act empowers the Chief Justice of
the IPIT Court to formulate and issue the Rules for Intellectual
Property and International Trade Cases209  ("Rules of the
Court"), including rules on proceedings and the hearing of evi-
dence.21' The only limit on this power is that the provisions can-
not impair the rights of the defendant in a criminal case.21 l In
addition, where the Rules of the Court are silent, the Civil Proce-
dural Code and the Criminal Procedural Code provide the de-
fault rules. 212 Granting the Chief Justice the authority to issue
the Rules of the Court, subject to the approval of the President
of the Supreme Court, permits quicker changes in the proce-
dure of the Court-in months rather than years-and allows the
Court to evolve as needed.2 1 3
The Thai civil law system has no antecedent for employing a
trade court may call any knowledgeable persons or experts to appear and give opinions
for its consideration." Id.
208. See Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 14 (maintaining that liberal use of Rules
for Intellectual Property and International Trade Cases ("Rules of Court") is salient
feature of system). Cf Thanitcul, supra note 20, at 31 (commenting that Thai legisla-
tion is usually very brief and limited to broad grants of empowerment to specified min-
istries or departments).
209. RULES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CASES B.E.
2540 (1997) (Thail.) [hereinafter RULES OF COURT].
210. ACT, supra note 17, § 30. Section 30 notes that:
For the purpose to [sic] ensure convenience, expediency and fairness of the
proceedings, the Chief Justice of the Central Intellectual Property and Inter-
national Trade Court shall be empowered, subject to the approval of the Presi-
dent of the Supreme Court, to issue Rules of the Court on proceedings and
hearing of evidence in the intellectual property and international trade cases
provided that such provisions shall not impair the right of defence [sic] of an
accused in a criminal case.
Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. § 26. Section 26 states that "[w]here there are no provisions and Rules on
the issue, the provisions of the Civil Procedural Code, the Criminal Procedure Code or
the Act for the Establishment of Kwaeng Court and its Criminal Procedure Code shall
apply mutatis mutandis." Id.
213. See Thaveechaiyagarn, supra note 180 (claiming that changes in procedure
for IPIT Court are achieved more quickly by altering Rules of Court than by amending
codes through acts of Parliament).
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common law procedure similar to the Rules of the Court.214 As
with most civil law regimes, any change in Thai procedural law is
accomplished by an amending the Procedural Code.215 One ex-
pert questions how much power the legislature intended to
grant the judiciary to perform what is, in Thailand, an essentially
legislative function, and whether the expenditure of this power
is a judicial encroachment on the powers of the legislature. 16
Notably, Section 37 of the Act grants the IPIT Court the discre-
tion to lengthen or shorten any period of time that is prescribed
in the Act.217 In effect, Section 37 of the Act allows the judiciary
to override the law established by the legislature when it con-
cerns time limits or delays.21
5. Expeditious Hearings
Another significant aspect of the IPIT Court originates in
Section 27 of the Act, which is intended to satisfy the three re-
quirements in Article 41 of TRIPs calling for expeditious reme-
dies, no unwarranted delays, and the written holdings of the case
to be made available to the parties without undue delay.219 Sec-
tion 27 of the Act provides for hearings to proceed without ad-
journment and for the IPIT Court to render judgment
promptly.22° This IPIT Court procedure starkly contrasts with
the standard practice of the general courts regarding civil cases,
214. See id. (asserting that IPIT Court differs from other courts in Thai judicial
system because it employs Rules of Court); see also Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 17
(contending that Rules of Court is common law solution unique to IPIT Court).
215. See Thaveechaiyagarn, supra note 180 (explaining that courts of general pro-
cedure are governed by statutory codes); Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 17 (declaring
that because Thailand is civil law country, procedural changes are generally accom-
plished by amending procedural codes).
216. See Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 17 (considering whether legislature in-
tended to give judiciary legislative role or blank-check).
217. AcT, supra note 17, § 37. Section 37 states that "[t]he intellectual property
and international trade court may, where necessary in the interest ofjustice, shorten or
extend the period of time prescribed in the Act or fixed by it, when it thinks fit or upon
application of any party concerned." Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. § 27. Section 27 mandates that "[a]fter the hearing is over, the court shall
promptly render ajudgment or order." Id.; TRIPs, supra note 10, arts. 41(1), (2), (3).
220. Acr, supra note 17, § 27. Section 27 also declares that "[t]he intellectual
property and international trade court shall proceed with the hearing without adjourn-
ment until the hearing is over, save in the case of unavoidable necessities." Id.
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wherein a case is heard only one day per month.22'
To ensure swift resolutions of intellectual property disputes,
Section 38 of the Act provides that both criminal and civil ap-
peals are made directly to the Thai Supreme Court.2 22 This form
of direct appeal to the Thai Supreme Court will bring disputes to
a final resolution swiftly.223 To ensure that the Thai Supreme
Court will have the necessary expertise to rule on these appeals,
Section 43 of the Act mandates that the Supreme Court shall
establish a special section to hear IPIT Court appeals.2 24
Sections 38 and 44 of the Act provide the parties with a
greater right to appeal than that required by Article 41(4) of
TRIPs . 2 5 Article 41(4) of TRIPs only requires that parties in a
civil case have a right to an appeal on a question of law provided
that the national laws do not otherwise prohibit the appeal.226
The Thai Supreme Court, however, is unique in that it may en-
tertain appeals both on question of law and questions of fact.2 27
Section 44 of the Act, furthermore, grants the Thai Supreme
Court additional flexibility in intellectual property matters by
empowering it with the discretion to hear an appeal that would
normally be prohibited by law.228
221. See Chua, supra note 25, at 228 (reporting that civil cases in courts of general
jurisdiction are heard in monthly installments of one day per month).
222. Acr, supra note 17, § 38. Section 38 states that "[s]ubject to the provisions of
this Act, the Civil Procedure Code or the Criminal Procedure Code, and appeal against
any judgment or order of the intellectual property and international trade court shall
be submitted to the Supreme Court within one month from the date of its pronounce-
ment." Id.
223. See Mattei, supra note 40 (noting that limitation to one appeal will avoid delay
in resolving proceedings).
224. Acr, supra note 17, § 43. Section 43 states that "[t]he President of the
Supreme Court shall set up an Intellectual Property and International Trade Section in
the Supreme Court for the adjudication of intellectual property and international trade
cases that may be appealed to the Supreme court." Id.
225. See AcT, supra note 17, § 38 (stating that appeals from IPIT Court directly go
to Thai Supreme Court); see also id. § 44 (stating that Thai Supreme Court has power to
entertain prohibited appeal). Cf Id. art. 41(4) (detailing allowable limitations on right
to appeal).
226. Id art. 41(4).
227. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 38, at THAI-9 (asserting that Thai
Supreme Court may hear appeals on both questions of law and of fact).
228. AcT, supra note 17, § 44. Section 44 provides:
In the case where the intellectual property and international trade court [sic]
has accepted an appeal for submission to the Supreme Court, and the
Supreme Court holds that such appeal is prohibited by law, the Supreme
Court shall dismiss the appeal. On the other hand, if the Supreme Court
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6. Provisional Measures
Another salient feature of the Act is that it makes available
to the claiming parties additional provisional measures, which
are unique to the IPIT Court.2 29 As a civil law country, Thailand
has neither a previously developed system of equitable proce-
dures, 2 ° nor any measure similar to a blanket authorization for
a search. 231 Generally, complaining parties only have access to
limited provisional measures in criminal cases by requesting a
police search.232 Granting provisional measures, such as preven-
tive injunctions, prior to filing a complaint is contrary to the
practices under the Civil Procedure Code.233 Because the com-
plaint in a civil case must contain specific evidence, most right-
holders have found that they cannot file a complaint without al-
ready obtaining an order to seize the evidence. 34
Sections 28 and 29 of the Act meet one of the obligations
set forth in Article 50 of TRIPs by expanding a right-holder's
ability to obtain evidence.235 Section 28 states that in civil and
deems it appropriate, for reason [sic] of fairness, to rectify the same, the
Supreme Court may accept and consider the appeal that is prohibited by law.
Id.
229. See Thaveechaiyagarn, supra note 180 (remarking that Act provides IPIT
Court with power to issue provisional measures that are not available in other Thai
courts); see also Ross-MacDonald, supra note 180 (asserting that IPIT Court employs
'exceptional procedures" such as ex parte search orders and emergency injunctions).
230. See Blatt & Miller, supra note 5, at 251 (claiming that Thailand has not devel-
oped common law system of equity and specific equity principles because it is civil law
country).
231. See Investment Climate 1997, supra note 16 (declaring that Thai police can re-
spond only to specific complaints because there is no blanket authorization for police
raids).
232. See Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 18 (alleging that conventional method
for protecting intellectual property rights against infringement is conducting police
raids).
233. See id. (concluding that preventive injunctions provided by IPIT Court are
novel to Thailand because civil procedure code only allows courts of general jurisdic-
tion to issue injunctions after complaining party has filed).
234. See Sujintaya, supra note 26 (revealing that clients who wish to file civil com-
plaints for infringement perceive civil system as problematic because it requires that
complaints contain evidence that is unobtainable without court order).
235. Ac-r, supra note 17, § 28. Section 28 states:
Where a person apprehends that the evidence on which he may have to rely in
the future will be lost or become difficult to produce, or where a party to a
case apprehends that the evidence on which he intends to rely will be lost
before he can adduce it in Court or become difficult to adduce at a later stage,
such person or party may apply to the Court by petition or motion for an
order directing such evidence to be taken at once.
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criminal cases, the IPIT Court may grant a motion for the evi-
dence to be taken at once when the evidence is necessary to
prove infringement and will become lost or difficult to obtain if
not taken.23 6 Section 28 of the Act also requires the IPIT Court
to notify the other party and grant that party the opportunity to
be heard before issuing a motion to seize the evidence. 2 7 This
requirement in Section 28 satisfies Article 42 of TRIPs that con-
cerns due process and notification, but contravenes Article
50(2) of TRIPs, which permits the court the discretion to grant
ex parte provisional measures. 238 In case of an emergency, Sec-
tion 29 of the Act allows the IPIT Court to issue an order imme-
diately to seize evidence without notifying the other side. 239
Sections 28 and 29 of the Act, however, do not meet the
other obligations set forth in Article 50 of TRIPs. 24 ° Neither Sec-
tion 28 nor Section 29 meets the requirement that the IPIT
Court have the authority to prevent an infringement from occur-
ring.241 Section 28 and Section 29 also do not delineate any cri-
teria for provisional measures, such as when an ex parte hearing
is appropriate, what timetable applies, whether the petitioner
should provide compensation for damages if the claim fails,
whether or when the defendant may request a review, and when
the provisional measures lapse.242
The Chief Justice of the IPIT Court and the author of the
Rules of the Court have noted that the Rules of the Court ad-
Id.; Id. § 29. Section 29 provides that:
In case of an emergency, when an application is filed under Section 28, the
applicant may simultaneously file a motion to the effect that the court may
issue an order or a warrant without delay. Where necessary, the applicant may
also request the court to seize or attach the documents or materials that will be
adduced as evidence upon any conditions as the Court may think fit.
Id. Cf TRIPs, supra note 10, art. 50(1) (requiring that courts have authority to preserve
relevant evidence with regard to alleged infringement).
236. Acr, supra note 17, § 28.
237. Id. Section 28 states that "[u]pon receipt of such application, the Court shall
summon the applicant and the opposing party or third person concerned, and after
having heard them, shall decide on the application as it thinks fit." Id.
238. Id. Cf TRIPs, supra note 10, arts. 42, 50(2).
239. Acr, supra note 17, § 28.
240. See TRIPs, supra note 10, art. 50(1) ("to prevent an infringement of any intel-
lectual property right from occurring..."); see also id. art. 50(2) ("to adopt provisional
measures inaudita altera parte where appropriate..."). Cf Acr, supra note 17, §§ 28, 29.
241. Id.
242. See Sumawong, supra note 177, at 5 (commenting that Act fails to provide
mechanism for application of interim injunction).
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dress many of the shortcomings in Sections 28 and 29 of the
Act.243 Rules 12 through 19 pertain to provisional measures of
protection prior to instituting an action.2 44 Rules 20 through 22
cover the taking of evidence in advance. 45
According to the Rules of the Court, the IPIT Court may
grant an application for a provisional measure under Section 65
of the Copyright Act, Section 77bis of the Patent Act, and Sec-
tion 116 of the Trademark Act.246 Taken together, these acts
prescribe that in cases where there is clear evidence that a per-
son commits, is committing, or is about to commit an infringe-
ment on another's intellectual property right, the right-holder
may petition the court for an order to restrain the infringer. 47
Nowhere else in Thai civil procedure is a claimant allowed to
petition the court for a restraining order prior to instituting an
action.248
Under Rule 13 of the Rules of the Court, the IPIT Court
243. See Sumawong, supra note 18 (stating that Rules of Court generally supple-
ment Act); Sumawong, supra note 177, at 6 (reporting that Rules of Court have cor-
rected omissions of Act regarding interim injunctions).
244. RULES OF COURT, supra note 209, rules 12-19. Rules 12-19 are titled "Provi-
sional Measures of Protection Prior to Instituting an Action." Id.
245. Id., rules 20-22. Rules 20-22 are tided "Application for Taking of Evidence in
Advance." Id.
246. See Sumawong, supra note 177, at 5 (noting that recent intellectual property
legislation equipping IPIT Court with authority to grant interim injunctions is novel to
Thai judicial process). Section 65 of the Copyright Act provides "[w ] here there is clear
evidence showing that a party is infringing or preparing to infringe a copyright or per-
former's rights, the owner of the copyright or performer's rights may petition the court
to order the party to cease those activities." COPYRMGHT ACT, B.E. 2537 § 65 (1994)
(Thail.). Section 116 of the Trademark Act declares:
Should there be express evidence that a person has performed or is perform-
ing any act according to Section 108, Section 109 or Section 110, the proprie-
tor of a trademark, service mark, certification mark or collective mark may
petition the court to instruct the person to stop or cease such act.
TRADEMARK Acr, B.E. 2534 § 116 (1991) (Thail.). Section 77bis of the Patent Act reads:
In the case where there is clear evidence that a person has committed or is
about to commit an act in violation of a patentee's or a petty patentee's rights
under Section 36 or Section 63 or Section 65 decem together with Section 36,
the patentee or petty patentee may apply to the court for an injunction against
the said person to stop or refrain from committing such act.
PATENT ACT, B.E. 2535 § 77bis (1992) (Thail.).
247. See Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 18 (recognizing that provisions of ex-
isting intellectual property acts grant right-holders permission to petition court for re-
straining orders against any person who they have evidence is committing, about to
commit, or commits act of infringement).
248. See id. (contending that restraining orders prior to filing were first instituted
in Thailand in intellectual property acts).
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may grant a temporary restraining order.249 The application for
the temporary restraining order may be held in camera.250 After
granting the restraining order, the IPIT Court must notify the
defendant, but the order is immediately effective regardless of
whether the defendant is actually contacted.2 5' The IPIT Court
may order the party requesting the restraining order to provide
a security for any damage that the prospective defendant may
incur as a result of the order. 52 After fifteen days, if the party
who requested the order does not institute an action relating to
the order, then the order lapses.253  Upon its lapse, the re-
strained party may request compensation for his or her damages
from the other party. 54
249. 42 AM. JUR. 2D 715. According to American Jurist, a temporary restraining
order differs from a temporary, interlocutory or preliminary injunction. Id. "A tempo-
rary restraining order, while in effect a species of injunction, is in some respects to be
distinguished therefrom. The purpose of such an order is to restrain the defendant for
what should be a very brief period, pending a hearing on the application of a tempo-
rary injunction .... " Id. A temporary restraining order, "is generally granted without
notice to the opposite parties, and is intended only as a restraint on the defendant until
the propriety of granting a temporary injunction can be determined, and it goes no
further than to preserve the status quo until that determination." Id.
250. RuLEs OF COURT, supra note 209, rule 19. Rule 19 provides that "[t]he provi-
sions on in camera proceedings and prohibition of publication under Rule 24 and hear-
ing conducted via video conferencing facility under Rule 32 shall apply to the proceed-
ings under Rules 13 and 15 to 18 mutatis mutandis." Id.
251. Id. rule 14. Rule 14 states that "[i]n case where the Court grants the applica-
tion under Rule 13, the Court shall notify the prospective defendant of the order with-
out delay. The order under paragraph one shall immediately bind the prospective de-
fendant even though the prospective defendant has not been notified of the order." Id.
252. Id. rule 15. Rule 15 notes that:
In case where the Court grants the application under Rule 13, taking into
account any damage that the prospective defendant might incur, the Court
shall order the person filing the application to provide security for such dam-
age in the amount, within the period and under the conditions, the Court
deems appropriate.
Id.
253. Id. rule 17, 1. Paragraph 1 of Rule 17 provides that:
In case where the Court grants the application under Rule 13 but the person
requesting for the provisional measures fails to institute an action relating to
the application within fifteen days from the date on which the application was
granted or within the period prescribed by the Court, the provisional meas-
ures shall lapse at the expiration of the aforesaid period.
Id.
254. Id. rule 17, 2. Paragraph 2 of Rule 17 allows that:
[T]he defendant may file with the Court, within thirty days from the date on
which the provisional measures is deemed to lapse, a request for the Court
order directing the person requesting for such measures to compensate him
for his damage. The Court may order the compensation be paid in the
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The Rules of the Court allow that the temporary restraining
order may become a preliminary injunction once the plaintiff
files an action. 255 After the IPIT Court grants the restraining or-
der, the prospective defendant may challenge the order and re-
quest that it be repealed or modified.2 5 6 Should the IPIT Court
grant a repeal, the prospective defendant may also request dam-
ages.2
57
Rules of the Court Rule 20, meanwhile, states that the IPIT
Court may grant an order for the taking of evidence under Sec-
tion 29 of the Act.258 This rule is similar to a less draconian ver-
sion of the British Anton Piller order.259  Article 50(1) (b) of
amount it deems appropriate. If the person requesting for the measures [sic]
fails to comply with such order, the Court may enforce such order as if he is a
judgment debtor.
Id.
255. See 42 AM.JUR. 2D 715 (defining preliminary or interlocutory injunction as, "a
form of equitable proceeding designed to protect from irreparable injury property, or
other rights of which a court of equity will take cognizance, by prohibiting or com-
manding the doing of certain acts."). Furthermore, American Jurist states that, "a tem-
porary injunction is rarely granted without notice, but when granted, it is effective until
the trial of the cause in which it issued." Id.
256. RULES OF COURT, supra note 209, rule 16, 1. Paragraph 1 of Rule 16 states in
part that "the prospective defendant may file an application requesting the Court to
repeal or modify the provisional measures of protection." Id.
257. Id. 12. Paragraph 2 of Rule 16 states that:
[T]he prospective defendant may make a request in the application to repeal
or modify the provisional measure, or file with the Court, within thirty days
from the date on which the Court issues an order repealing of modifying the
measures, a request for the Court order directing the person requesting for
such measures to compensate him for his damage.
Id.
258. Id. rule 20, 2. The relevant language in paragraph 2 of Rule 20 states:
In case of emergency under section 29 of the Act, the motion shall state the
facts showing the emergency situation which, if the other party or the third
party involved is to be notified beforehand, such evidence will be damaged,
lost, destroyed or, due to some other reasons, difficult to be adduced at a later
stage.
Id.
259. See Anton Piller KG v. Manufacturing Process Ltd., (1976) 1 All E.R. 779
(Eng. C.A. 1975) (holding that courts have inherent jurisdiction to prevent destruction
of subject matter of action or documents). The Anton Piller order is a pre-suit or pre-
judgment discovery procedure that allows a person claiming intellectual property rights
to search the premise of an alleged violator of those rights and to seize goods, materials,
or documents that may later become evidence in a cause of action. See Samual K. Alex-
ander III, The Mareva Injunction and Related Orders, by Dr. Mark S.W. Hoyle, London:
Lloyd's of London Press (1997), 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 503 (1999) (book review) (stating that
purpose of Anton Piller order is to prevent alleged violator from destroying evidence
before trial or writ is issued). Under Anton Piller, the court may grant an application for
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TRIPS does not require that the member countries provide any
measure as drastic as the Anton Piller order.26' The "reformed"
Anton Piller order, as defined in the Rules of the Court, pro-
vides for the plaintiff to supply a security to compensate the de-
fendant for any damages caused by granting the order should
the plaintiff's claim fail. 26 1 The Drafting Committee of the Rules
of the Court also preferred that the information or material ac-
quired as a result of the order not be used for any purpose other
than the action, that an officer of the court be present in enforc-
ing the order, and that the plaintiff is not entitled to use force.2 62
While the Anton Piller order in the United Kingdom may
be used to order the defendant to supply the plaintiff with the
names and addresses of his clients and suppliers, this situation is
not the case in Thailand.26" The Thai Constitution has provi-
sions against self-incrimination that are supreme.264 Article 47
an injunction ex parte and in camera. Alexander, supra. The court may issue an Anton
Piller order if the plaintiff can satisfy the court that he has an extremely strong prima
fade case on the merits, that he is likely to suffer serious damage for the defendants
actions, that there is clear evidence that the defendant has incriminating documents or
articles in his possession, and that there is grave danger that the defendant will destroy
the material before a hearing where both parties are present could be conducted. Id.;
see Christopher Finlayson, Keynote, Proving Your Case-Evidence and Procedure in Action,
13 CADozo L. REv. 257, 276 (describing how United Kingdom amended legislation to
remove privilege of self-incrimination in situation of interrogatories). The Anton Piller
order allows the court to order the defendant to disclose the names and addresses of
his suppliers or customers to the plaintiff. Finlayson, supra; see also Marett, supra note 1,
at 16 (remarking that Anton Piller order is civil procedure and must not be confused
with search warrant). The Anton Piller order should not be confused with a search
warrant in a criminal case. Marett, supra; see Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 23 (not-
ing that, should Anton Piller order be unavailable, plaintiff may try to obtain search
warrant).
260. TRIPs, supra note 10, art. 50(1) (b) ("to preserve relevant evidence in regard
to the alleged infringement").
261. RULES OF COURT, supra note 209, rule 21. Rule 21 provides that:
In case where the Court grants an order for attachment or seizure of docu-
ments or materials to be adduced as evidence in emergency situation under
Rule 20 paragraph two, the Court may order the petitioner to provide security
for any damage that might be incurred, in the amount, within the period and
under any condition the Court deems appropriate.
Id.
262. See Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 22-23 (explaining that Section 29 of Act
and Rules 20-22 of Rules of Court provide for reformed Anton Piller order that limits
rights of moving party).
263. Id. (describing differences between Thai and English practice of Anton Piller
order).
264. WRTTErN CONSTITUTION OF THAILAND, B.E. 2540 art. 243 (1997) (Thail.). Arti-
cle 243 of the Written Constitution of Thailand provides that "[p] ersons have the right
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of TRIPs, furthermore, does not require that the court grant a
right of information; it only states that member countries may
empower the courts with the authority to order the defendant to
provide such information to the plaintiff.2 65 Thailand, there-
fore, does not violate its TRIPs obligations by denying this
right.
2 6 6
B. Responses to the IPIT Court
Some scholars predicted that the establishment of the IPIT
Court would result in increased trade and economic success for
Thailand and would solve Thailand's intellectual property en-
forcement problems.267 Although the IPIT Court is functioning
efficiently as intended,2 68 serious problems with intellectual
property enforcement persist.269 While many of the problems
with intellectual property enforcement are within the control of
the IPIT Court,270 others are not.27' Due to these problems, the
to refuse to give statements against themselves which could cause themselves to be sued
in a criminal case." Id.
265. TRIPs, supra note 10, art. 47.
266. See Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 24 (noting that Thailand could choose
whether to grant right of information under TRIPs).
267. See id. at 13 (commenting that IPIT Court is single most important develop-
ment in creating legal environment to encourage international trade and investment);
Thaveechaiyagarn, supra note 180 (claiming that multinational companies that import
technology into Thailand feel secure that IPIT Court will provide fair and efficient fo-
rum to defend their intellectual property rights); Vechayanon, supra note 23, at 39 (as-
serting that IPIT Court aspires to play important role in furthering Thai efforts of
globalization).
268. See Sumawong, supra note 177, at 4 (setting forth that IPIT Court provides
effective intellectual property enforcement mechanism); Sujintaya, supra note 26 (re-
porting that litigating in IPIT Court is more efficient and effective than litigating in
courts of general jurisdiction because it its more conscientious); Investment Climate 1998,
supra note 25 (noting that IPIT Court beginning to make difference in intellectual
property enforcement in Thailand); Report Rates IPR Accomplishments by Asian Countries,
BUSINEssWoRL (Phil.), Nov. 25, 1999 (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal) [hereinafter 1999 PERC Report] (citing report by Political and Economic Risks Con-
sultancy, Ltd., which claims IPIT Court is working well).
269. See Howley & Roman, supra note 13 (remarking that piracy is still rampant
despite creation of Department of Intellectual Property and IPIT Court); 1999 PERC
Report, supra note 268 (commenting that Thai law and policy are adequate, but enforce-
ment remains weak).
270. See 1999 PERC Report, supra note 268 (maintaining that only retailers have
been charged with infringement at IPIT Court); Investment Climate 1997, supra note 16
(stating that jail sentences and fines are too light to constitute deterrents).
271. See Investment Climate 1998, supra note 25 (reporting that allegations of police
irregularities affect intellectual property enforcement in Thailand); Ariyanuntaka,
supra note 182, at 11 (citing International Intellectual Property Alliance report that
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rate of intellectual property violations in Thailand has in-
creased, 272 despite the efforts of the Thai government. 27
Experts differ on whether the IPIT Court satisfies Thai-
land's enforcement obligations under TRIPs or merely repre-
sents progress towards meeting its TRIPs obligationsY7 4 Experts
do agree, however, that the Thai system of intellectual property
enforcement and the TRIPS requirements for enforcement and
remedies diverge in several aspects. 2 75 According to the U.S.
Trade Representative, the Thai Patent Act of 1992 does not com-
ply with TRIPs standards. 276  The Thai Patent Act of 1992 pro-
reveals that sharing of policing duties, once solely held by Thailand's Economic Crime
Investigation Division, has increased level of intellectual property rights enforcement
activity); see also Thailand Still on U.S. Watchlist over IPR, NATION (Thail.), May 25, 1999
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (revealing that infringers use meth-
ods, such as delivery of infringing goods through private Express Mail Service, that are
difficult to police); Rice, supra note 70 (noting that infringers have begun to use vio-
lence against Thai private investigators hired by U.S. companies).
272. See Jirapan Boonoon, Legislation Will Be Amended for Copyrights, NATION
(Thail.), Oct. 6, 1998 (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (citing Price-
Waterhouse study that claimed rate of software copyright violation in Thailand in-
creased to 85% in 1997 from 82% in 1996).
273. See Weeraworawit, supra note 19, at 19 (revealing that Thai government estab-
lished many committees to handle problem of intellectual property violations and De-
partment of Intellectual Property has begun public education campaigns); see also Boo-
noon, supra note 272 (asserting that Thai government proposed new legislation and set
up new committee to prevent intellectual property violations because it realized that
without serious effort at improving intellectual property enforcement, U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative would impose trade sanctions); Investment Climate 1998, supra note 25 (not-
ing increase in seizures of infringing materials); Thai Software Pirates Hit by Government
Crackdown, BUSINESS DAY (THAIL.), JULY 9, 1999, at 1 (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) (reporting that IPIT Court handed out its first jail sentence to re-
tailer); Copyright Violation Arrests Stepped Up: Better Enforcement Intended to Satisfy Western
Concerns, BANGKOK Pos-r (TrIaL.), MAY 26, 1997 (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) (stating that Thailand increased arrests for copyright violations after com-
plaints by Western businesses in Thailand).
274. See Sumawong, supra note 177, at 1 ("The establishment in Thailand of the
Central IP&IT Court is an answer to the enforcement of intellectual property rights
under TRIPs .... [T]he court is established along the guidelines laid down by the
provisions in Part III of the TRIPs Agreement."); Ruggiero, supra note 2 (stating that
IPIT Court is important for fulfillment of Thailand's international commitments);
Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 11 (citing International Intellectual Property Alliance
report, which states that Thailand has gone far towards meeting its substantive obliga-
tions and U.S. Trade Representative should encourage Thailand to continue rapid pro-
gress towards full compliance).
275. See Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 10 (noting that particular Thai intellec-
tual property laws, procedures, and enforcement are not in accord with TRIPs provi-
sions); Investment Climate 1998, supra note 25 (stating that Thailand's patent law does
not conform to TRIPs).
276. See Preeti Sinha, Special 301: An Effective Tool Against Thailand's Intellectual
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vides for compulsory licensing, which Article 31 of TRIPs 2 7 7 al-
lows, but limits by entitling the patent holder to a reasonable
royalty.278 The U.S. Trade Representative also maintains that the
Thai system does not provide sufficient compensation to the suc-
cessful complainant under TRIPs. 279 Article 64 of the Copyright
Act of 1994 only allows the court to determine and order appro-
piate damages and expenses if the infringer foresaw or could
Property Violations, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL'YJ. 281, 297 (1993) (revealing that U.S. Trade
Representative disapproves of Thai patent legislation that established Thai Pharmaceu-
tical Patent Board); see also Howley & Roman, supra note 13 (noting that U.S. Trade
Representative objects to Thai patent protection levels and Pharmaceutical Patent
Board); Myles Getlan, Comment, TRIPS and the Future of Section 301: A Comparative Study
in Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173, 197 (1995) (stating that
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association petitioned U.S. Trade Representative under
Section 301 with objections to Thailand's compulsory licenses, requirement of manu-
facture or use of patent in Thailand, and Pharmaceutical Patent Board). According to
Miles Getlan, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association estimates that U.S.-based
members have lost between US$16 and US$24 million in Thailand. Getlan, supra. In
1991, the U.S. Trade Representative demanded that Thailand amend its patent laws
within 180 days or face sanctions. Id. The Thai drug companies, academics, and medi-
cal community objected to the proposed changes. Id. They argued that the changes
advocated by the U.S Trade Representative would raise drug prices, create monopolies,
make Thailand dependent on the holders of foreign drug patents, bankrupt the gov-
ernment's public health budget, and prevent the government from licensing drugs in a
medical emergency. Id. In 1992, the National Assembly amended the patent legisla-
tion. Id. At the same time, the National Assembly established the Pharmaceutical Pat-
ent Board to counteract the concerns of those who opposed the amendments. See Tit,
LEKE & GIBBINS, supra note 22 (claiming that Thai government established Pharmaceuti-
cal Patent Board to monitor drug prices); McDorman, supra note 87, at 97 (reporting
Thai opinions that change to Patent Act would make Thailand's market vulnerable to
foreign drug monopolies); Sujintaya, supra note 26 (asserting that many Thais view
Pharmaceutical Board as necessary to promote access to drug patents held by non-Thai
pharmaceutical companies).
277. TRIPs, supra note 10, art. 31. The pertinent language of Article 31 reads:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a
patent without the authorization of the right-holder, including use by the gov-
ernment or third parties authorized by the government .... the right-holder
shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking
into account the economic value of the authorization[.]
Id.
278. See Blatt & Miller, supra note 5, at 247 (remarking that TRIPs limits, but does
not eliminate, compulsory licensing); see also Reichman, supra note 120, at 355 (explain-
ing that TRIPs allows compulsory licensing under Article 31 if grounds for triggering
non-exclusive compulsory licensing is due to abuse and if would-be-licensee first seeks
negotiated license from right-holder and agrees to pay equitable compensation).
279. See Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 25 (stating that Section 64 of Copyright
Act of 1994 does not meet compensation requirements of TRIPs); see also Investment
Climate 1997, supra note 16 (remarking that Thai courts do not satisfy their TRIPs re-
quirements for damages).
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have foreseen the consequences of the action that caused the
injury.280 This judicial limitation complies with the requirement
of Article 45(1) of TRIPs for awarding adequate damages when
an infringer acts knowingly or with reasonable grounds to
know281 but, does not satisfy Article 45(2) of TRIPs, which pro-
vides for the inclusion of appropriate attorney fees in cases of
knowing infringement and the recovery of profits even in cases
of unknowing infringement.282
Another way in which Thai law is inconsistent with TRIPs is
that the right to information granted to the right-holder in Arti-
cle 47 of TRIPs conflicts with Article 243 of the Thai Constitu-
tion,283 which grants a defendant the right against self-incrimina-
tion.2 8 ' Additionally, while Article 61 of TRIPs mandates that
certain willful violators who operate on a commercial scale be
subject to criminal proceedings, imprisonment, and fines, Thai-
land still allows these accused infringers to settle with the right-
holder.2 85 Despite the TRIPs requirement, Thailand continues
280. COPYRIGHT Acr, B.E. 2537, § 64 (1994) (Thail). Section 64 of the Copyright
Act provides:
In the case of infringement of a copyright or performer's rights, the court has
the authority to have the infringer pay damages to the owner of the copyright
or the party having the performer's rights in an amount judged appropriate
by the court, taking into account the severity of the damage inflicted and in-
cluding any losses and essential expenses incurred because of the need for a
lawsuit to protect the copyright or performer's rights.
Id.
281. TRIPs, supra note 10, art. 45(1).
282. Id. art. 45(2).
283. WRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF Ta4JLA.n, B.E. 2540 art. 243 (1997) (Thail.).
284. See Ariyanuntaka, supra note 182, at 24 (noting that applying Article 47 of
TRIPs in criminal case infringes on privilege against self-incrimination.)
285. See Interview with Huey S. Tan, Counsel for Microsoft, Southeast Asia Region,
in Bangkok, Thail. (June 24, 1999) (discussing problems in intellectual property protec-
tion encountered by Microsoft in Thailand). According to Huey Tan, the IPIT Court is
"brilliant for speed" and is getting good sentences and fines. Id. Supporting Tan's
assertion are statistics showing the increased arrests and seizures handled by the IPIT
Court. See Investment Climate 1998, supra note 25 (citing statistics that intellectual prop-
erty related arrests increased 48% in 1997 and that seizures have increased to 568,000
from 168,000); see also Copyright Violation Arrests Stepped Up, supra note 273 (describing
efforts of government to lower rates of copyright piracy). Enforcement of intellectual
property rights in Thailand, however, remains a problem for Microsoft despite the new
IPIT Court and intellectual property acts that increase the rights of owners. Tan, supra.
One possible explanation is a lack of respect in Asia for intellectual property stemming
from a lack of understanding of the value of intellectual property rights, a lack of vested
interest, and a lack of input. Id. This situation can only be rectified by training and
educating the general public on the hidden costs of insufficient intellectual property
20001
842 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:795
to handle cases against these infringers as civil, not criminal,
matters.
286
The U.S. Trade Representative has again placed Thailand
on its Special 301 Watch List, because some Thai nationals con-
tinue to commit intellectual property violations at a high rate
and because Thailand has failed to maintain intellectual prop-
erty laws compliant with TRIPs. 28 7 Some experts maintain that
the U.S. Trade Representative should recognize that Thailand,
as a developing country, does not have resources comparable to
the United States to monitor and prosecute intellectual property
violators effectively. 288 Experts also note that the U.S. Trade
Representative's use of Special 301 has caused resentment and
created anti-U.S. factions in Thailand, where none previously ex-
isted. 289
protection, such as a brain-drain of talented programmers throughout the region and
disincentives for start-up software companies tailored to Thai needs. Id. Another prob-
lem is that many people who purchase infringing material use the Asian financial crisis
as a justification. Id.
286. See Tan, supra note 285 (remarking that punishment of infringers in Thailand
is often lighter than TRIPs mandates).
287. See Boonoon, supra note 272 (claiming that United States used punitive trade
measures against Thailand after increased software copyright violations due to devalua-
tion of Thai baht); Thailand Still on U.S. Watchlist over IPR, supra note 271 (revealing
that United States put Thailand on Watch List because of intellectual property viola-
tions despite Thailand's increased efforts for suppression); 1999 PERC Report, supra
note 268 (declaring that Thailand is on Watch List because of poor enforcement of
intellectual property laws although IPIT Court is working well and Thailand's policies
and laws are adequate); Howley & Roman, supra note 13 (asserting that, despite Thai-
land's recent accomplishments, such as establishing IPIT Court and committee on in-
tellectual property, U.S. Trade Representative recommended Thailand be placed on
Watch List in 1998 because of rampant infringement and patent law that does not com-
ply with TRIPs standards).
288. See Sinha, supra note 276, at 297 (stating that United States should recognize
that developing countries do not have strong administrative systems to enforce intellec-
tual property rights and such enforcement is subject almost entirely to political pro-
cess); Vitthya Vejjajiva, Ambassador of Thailand, Letters to the Editor, WASH. POST, Apr. 5,
1989 ("Americans should understand that there are limits to how fast Thailand can
move-just as the United States has political limits in a comparable situation.");
O'Neill, supra note 50, at 623 (noting that Thailand's difficulty in reforming legislation
may be due to healthy state of democracy).
289. See Suvicha Pouaree, Friends For Life?, BANGKOK POST, May 30, 1999 (describ-
ing that many Thai leaders view U.S. sanctions as trade protectionism and economic
aggression). Suchiva Pouaree suggests that Thai-U.S. economic relations began to dete-
riorate when the U.S. trade surplus became a trade deficit and the Cold War ended,
making Thailand less important to U.S. strategic interests. Id. According to Dr.
Chaichana Ingavata, Dean of Graduate Studies at Ramkhamhaeng University, "[ifn
Thailand, with all [the] political and economic pressure that the U.S. has applied on us,
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III. THE IPIT COURT IS AN EFFICIENT MECHANISM FOR
ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, BUT IT
CANNOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF INTELECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY ITSELF
The Act makes the enforcement procedures specified in
Part III of TRIPs available in the IPIT Court.29' As a democracy,
the Thai government is limited in what steps it may take to eradi-
cate intellectual property rights violations. 291  The IPIT Court is
a separate court from the other courts of first instance in the
judicial system and thus has a historical basis in Thailand.292
The IPIT Court applies enforcement procedures that conform
to the expectations of developed Western nations.2 93
A. The IPIT Court Reduces Conflict Between Western and Thai Views
of Intellectual Property Rights
The IPIT Court reduces conflict between Western and Thai
views of intellectual property rights. In part, this conflict arises
from a conflict of interests between Thailand as a net consumer
of intellectual property and the Western nations as net produ-
cers. 294 An example of this conflict between the Western and
the people feel that the U.S. is drunk with power." Id. Another scholar, Dr. Chaiwat
Khamchoo, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science, adds that the United States can
ignore negative reactions and resentment among developing nations because they are
dependent on the U.S. market. Id. Dr. Ingavata, further asserts that U.S. foreign policy
is responsible for the devaluation of the Thai baht and that "the global economy is
controlled by the U.S., with the WTO as its main mechanism." Id. Subscribing to this
view, Thai Democrat MP Charoen Kanthawong led a protest against the United States
for alleged unfair blocking of Thailand's candidate, Mr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, for
head of the WTO. Id. Additionally, Thai Senator Meechai Ruchupan, when proposing
that Thailand review its foreign policy with the United States, said "Thailand must have
political claws of its own and must not kowtow [bow down] to Washington or feel kreng
jai [fear] towards the United States all the time." Id.
290. See supra notes 119-73 and accompanying text (discussing TRIPs Part III en-
forcement procedures). Cf supra note 215-62 and accompanying text (discussing en-
forcement procedures available in IPIT Court).
291. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing political limitation and
accountability of Thai government).
292. See supra notes 28, 40, 41, 176 and accompanying text (describing prior sepa-
rate courts).
293. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing effect of conforming to
TRIPs).
294. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (reasoning that interests of coun-
tries that import intellectual property differ from those that export it).
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Thai views is the Thai Pharmaceutical Patent Board.295 Accord-
ing to Western opinions, the Thai Pharmaceutical Patent Board
is an obstacle to free trade. 29 6 According to the Thais, it is a
protector of Thai interests from monopoly by rich and powerful
pharmaceutical companies.297
As Thailand's legal traditions partially consist of Buddhist
law and Chinese Maritime Law, Thailand shares with other Asian
cultures values that are antagonistic to private intellectual prop-
erty rights. In most Asian societies, including Thailand, in-
venting a product, creating a work of art, or advancing learning
is an activity in the public domain. 298 The fruits of these activi-
ties do not warrant special legal protections that benefit the indi-
vidual over the community.299
Additional factors contribute to the Thai view of intellectual
property. 300 Educational and economic factors contribute to
what is perceived as a lack of respect for intellectual property in
Asia.3"1 Since the Asian financial crisis, there has been an addi-
tional economic incentive to purchase infringing goods.30 2 One
expert suggests that it is the lack of vested interest and input that
contributes most to the problem; because Thais are consumers
and not involved in building the product, they do not under-
stand the harm in piracy.303 Educating the Thai consumer is key
to overcoming these factors.30 4
In Western societies, intellectual property is merely another
form of private property.305 Under this view, when a foreign gov-
295. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing difference of opinion
between Thai and Western interests regarding Thai Drug Patent Board).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (stating that inventing and creating
works are in public domain in traditional Asian society).
299. Id.
300. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (noting that cultural values form
Asian view of intellectual property).
301. See supra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing problems of intellectual
property protection encountered by Microsoft).
302. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (noting that devaluation of Thai
baht increased rate of infringement).
303. See supra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for high rate of
infringement in Thailand).
304. Id.; see supra note 273 and accompanying text (noting that Thai government
has begun to educate public against consuming infringing goods).
305. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing Western theories behind
intellectual property).
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ernment does not recognize or enforce the protection of a U.S.
citizen's intellectual property, it is a taking that also serves as a
barrier to that citizen's trading in his or her own intellectual
property.30 6 This premise supports the U.S. view that intellectual
property infringement in a domestic market distorts interna-
tional trade.3" 7 Thus, Western nations use diplomatic tech-
niques to impose Western cultural values, while overlooking the
culture and customs of Asian countries.
The Thai people have a long tradition of acknowledging
other beliefs and allowing the followers of other beliefs to co-
exist peacefully within Thailand, while maintaining a separate
Thai identity.30 9 The idea that there is no justice at the expense
of harmony is fundamental to Buddhism and integrated into
Thai jurisprudence. For example, the Code on the Conflict of
Laws310 reflects the recognition of a pluralistic society where per-
sons of different faiths may be subject to different personal
laws.311 The IPIT Court follows in this tradition by satisfying
Thailand's TRIPs enforcement obligations as well as Western
pressure regarding intellectual property protection, without al-
tering the manner in which the entire Thai legal system oper-
ates. Thus, it is a Thai institution, although it employs proce-
dures that are alien to the rest of the Thai legal system.
B. The IPIT Court Is a Dependable Enforcement Mechanism
The IPIT Court is an efficient mechanism for enforcing in-
tellectual property rights irrespective of the rate of intellectual
property infringement. 12 After its establishment, the number of
306. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing U.S. perspective con-
cerning non-recognition of intellectual property).
307. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (claiming that United States asserts
that trade distortions result from ineffective or nonexistent intellectual property protec-
tion),
308. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (describing TRIPs as mechanism
for Western imperialism); see also supra note 118 and accompanying text (describing
effect of TRIPs on developing nations' cultures).
309. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (stating that traditional Thai "co-
existence" allowed for maintenance of separate cultural identities and mores).
310. CODE ON THE CONFLUCT OF LAWS, B.E. 2481 (1934) (Thail.).
311. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (explaining that Thai law recognizes
different cultures within its jurisdiction).
312. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting the accomplishments of
Thailand to improve intellectual property protection); see also supra note 268 and ac-
companying text (describing IPIT Court as efficient).
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intellectual property arrests increased in 1997 by forty-eight per-
cent from 1996, while the number of seizures of infringing
materials more than tripled. 13 Yet, despite these impressive
numbers, intellectual property infringement has not decreased
by corresponding rates, even though the IPIT Court strictly en-
forces the law.3 14
Rather, the conclusion that the IPIT Court is efficient rests
on the fact that it provides a dependable enforcement mecha-
nism. 15 According to experts, the IPIT Court quickly resolves
cases and imposes adequate sentences and fines when neces-
sary. 16 Additionally, the IPIT Court is fulfilling its mandate dili-
gently, raising the confidence of multinational joint ventures
that import intellectual property into Thailand.31 7 The IPIT
Court makes multinational joint ventures feel more secure in
transferring technology to Thailand.318
C. The IPIT Court Meets Thailand's Enforcement Obligations
Under TRIPS
The IPIT Court, furthermore, is a positive development be-
cause it meets Thailand's enforcement obligations under
TRIPS. 19 The IPIT Court contributes to the general Thai ef-
forts to reduce intellectual property infringement and thus avoid
trade sanctions.32' By meeting its obligations under TRIPS,
Thailand can argue that the United States is unjustified in con-
tinuing Special 301 trade sanctions. 321 The establishment of an
313. See supra note 285 and accompanying text (citing statistical improvements in
intellectual property enforcement in 1997 from 1996).
314. See supra notes 268, 272 and accompanying text (describing increase in rate of
infringement during period when IPIT Court is functioning well).
315. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (discussing sources that approve of
IPIT Court's efficiency),
316. See supra note 285 and accompanying text (noting positive aspects of IPIT
Court).
317. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (discussing perception of IPIT
Court held by multi-national joint ventures in Thailand).
318. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (predicting effect of IPIT Court on
non-Thai companies).
319. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing IPIT Court as means
for achieving TRIPs enforcement obligations).
320. See supra note 273 and accompan'ing text (discussing Thailand's efforts for
reducing rate of infringement).
321. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing unreasonableness of ap-
plying Section 301 to Thailand for intellectual property infringement); see also supra
note 284 (providing reasons why United States should not impose trade sanction).
TRIPS TO THAILAND
effective intellectual property court is evidence of Thailand's ef-
forts to eradicate piracy.122 It is difficult to legitimize penalizing
the government and the people of Thailand for the activities of
violators who have the resources to violate the law, especially
when the government lacks the resources to combat the prob-
lem. 3 2 3
CONCLUSION
The IPIT Court is mutually beneficial to Thai interests, in
attracting foreign direct investment, and the interests of foreign
intellectual property right-holders. The IPIT Court provides a
mechanism for Thailand to develop a system that conforms to
Thai concerns and customs, as it furthers Thai development
goals in the WTO by meeting Thailand's TRIPs obligations.
Without the IPIT Court, Thai resentment at U.S. pressure re-
garding intellectual property right enforcement would be dan-
gerous. 24 The IPIT Court, however, has managed to avoid this
public backlash because the Thai public considers the IPIT
Court to be a mechanism for encouraging direct investment
from non-Thai investors, technology transfer, and the recovery
of the Thai economy. 325
322. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing IPIT Court as mecha-
nism for reducing rate of infringement).
323. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (commenting that penalizing Thai
government and people for lacking resources to halt illegal pirating is different than
when government sanctions criminal activity that has harmful effect within United
States).
324. See supra note 289 and accompanying text (describing escalating Thai resent-
ment of U.S. pressure to adopt unwanted intellectual property laws).
325. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (describing positive view of IPIT
Court held by Thais); see also supra note 263 (discussing Thai predictions that IPIT
Court will invite foreign direct investment aiding Thailand's economic recovery).
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